

Just Do IT?

An Assessment of Inflation Targeting in a Global Comparative Case Study*

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Abstract

This paper introduces novel measures to assess the effectiveness of inflation targeting (IT) and examines its performance across a broad sample of advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Utilizing synthetic control methods, the study reveals heterogeneous effects of IT on inflation. The results indicate modest reductions in inflation levels, with greater gains observed in EMDEs compared to AEs. Statistically significant reductions are found in approximately one-third of the countries. However, nearly half of the economies experienced substantial improvements in stabilizing inflation near target levels under IT, relative to estimated counterfactual scenarios. IT also enhances economic resilience cushioning inflation from large external shocks, particularly during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis, with statistically significant gains observed in two-thirds of EMDEs. Additionally, the effectiveness of IT—both in shifting inflation levels and maintaining stability around target—is significantly correlated with indices of exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence, especially in EMDEs. These findings suggest that the performance of IT regimes is subject to the constraints imposed by the impossibility trilemma of international finance.

JEL Classification: **C33, E31, E42, E52, E58, E61, N10**

KEY WORDS: Inflation-Targeting Regime, Monetary Policy, Inflation, Synthetic Control Methods.

Resumen

Este artículo presenta medidas novedosas para evaluar la efectividad de las metas de inflación (MI) y examina su desempeño en una amplia muestra de economías avanzadas (EA) y economías de mercados emergentes y en desarrollo (EMED). Utilizando métodos de control sintéticos, el estudio revela efectos heterogéneos de las MI sobre la inflación. Los resultados indican reducciones modestas en los niveles de inflación, observándose mayores ganancias en las EMED en comparación con las EA. Se encuentran reducciones estadísticamente significativas en aproximadamente un tercio de los países. No obstante, casi la mitad de las economías experimentaron mejoras sustanciales en la estabilización de la inflación cerca de los niveles objetivo bajo el régimen de MI, en relación con los escenarios contrafactuales estimados. Las MI también mejoran la resiliencia económica al amortiguar la inflación frente a grandes shocks externos, particularmente durante la crisis financiera global de 2007 – 09, observándose ganancias estadísticamente significativas en dos tercios de las EMED. Además, la eficacia de las MI (tanto para ajustar los niveles de inflación como para mantener la estabilidad alrededor del objetivo de inflación) está significativamente correlacionada con los índices de estabilidad del tipo de cambio y de independencia de la política monetaria, especialmente en las EMED. Estos hallazgos sugieren que el desempeño de los regímenes de MI está sujeto a las limitaciones impuestas por el trilema de imposibilidad de las finanzas internacionales.

Códigos de clasificación JEL: **C33, E31, E42, E52, E58, E61, N10**

PALABRAS CLAVE: Régimen de Metas de Inflación, Política Monetaria, Inflación, Métodos de Control Sintético.

1 Introduction

Price stabilization through inflation targeting (IT) regimes became the norm in central banks since the 1990s. From 1989 to date, more than forty countries have adopted an IT regime. Some of them had suffered hyperinflationary or high-inflation periods before its adoption (e.g., Albania, Peru, Poland). One has suffered a seemingly never-ending deflationary episode (Japan). Only a handful of them have abandoned IT in order to adopt the Euro (Spain, Finland, and the Slovak Republic) or other monetary arrangements (Albania and Argentina). In sharp contrast with the past, many inflation-targeting central banks (ITCBs) enjoyed low and stable inflation rates since implementing IT until the post-pandemic inflation surge, with averages around 2.5% and 5% in advanced economies (AEs) and emerging and developing economies (EMDEs), respectively.

Since the Great Inflation era in the 1970s and into the 1980s, AEs have pursued policies and strategies to fight inflation. Likewise, EMDEs since the 1990s have followed in their footsteps, adopting similar approaches. In the view of many scholars and even policy makers, IT has since then been the preferred monetary policy framework ([Hammond \(2012\)](#)). In the recent pandemic times, some concerns have reemerged, raising anew the question of whether the IT framework contributes to maintain low and stable inflation. In this paper, we investigate whether the implementation of an IT scheme was effective among the countries that followed that path. We also investigate the institutional and structural features that made adopting IT more favorable and likely to succeed in its goals, at least pre-pandemic.

The literature on the effectiveness of IT to which we contribute is inconclusive. On the one hand, several studies claim that ITCBs have been successful in various dimensions. According to some of these studies, IT has played a significant role in bringing inflation down and stabilizing inflation fluctuations, lowering inflation volatility ([Debelle \(1997\)](#); [Corbo et al. \(2002\)](#); [Pétursson \(2005\)](#); [Brito and Bystedt \(2010\)](#); [Bleich et al. \(2012\)](#)). Inflation targets allowed a larger disinflation with smaller forecast errors ([Johnson \(2002\)](#)) and coincide with an (often downward) shift in expected inflation and the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations ([Johnson \(2003\)](#); [Levin et al. \(2004\)](#); [Kose et al. \(2019\)](#)). IT has been successfully used to lock in the gains from previous disinflations in the face of large one-time shocks ([Mishkin and Posen \(1997\)](#); [Corbo et al. \(2002\)](#); [Bernanke et al. \(2018\)](#)). IT has even been associated with improved macro performance and lower vulnerability to crises relative to other monetary policy regimes ([IMF \(2006\)](#))—the performance of IT during the 2007 – 09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), in particular, has received a fair amount of attention ([de Carvalho Filho \(2010\)](#); [Rose \(2014\)](#)). Moreover, using a meta-regression analysis,

Balima et al. (2020) find IT to be correlated with lower inflation even after controlling for publication selection bias.

On the other hand, criticisms of IT have not been absent. A number of studies show skepticism or do not find a statistically significant difference in inflation levels among IT and non-IT adopters (Dueker and Fischer (1996); Groeneveld et al. (1998); von Hagen and Neumann (2002); Ball and Sheridan (2004); Dueker and Fischer (2006); Blinder et al. (2008); Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2010); Ball (2010); Willard (2012); Alpanda and Honig (2014); Ardakani et al. (2018); among others). Furthermore, a subset of this literature has also argued that if IT is effective, it is mainly among EMDEs (Gonçalves and Salles (2008); Lin and Ye (2009); Akyurek et al. (2011); Lee (2011); de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza (2012); Gerlach and Tillmann (2012); Samarina et al. (2014); Mariscal et al. (2018)).

Some of the more skeptical findings could be attributed to differences between measured performance and the actual goals pursued by IT adopters. For example, IT effectiveness might be evaluated on its ability to bring inflation down. But, for some, having already achieved a low inflation after a prior disinflationary process, the main objectives of IT are instead to lower inflation volatility around the target and to build resilience to large shocks in order to lock in those prior gains. In other words, IT schemes are not necessarily disinflationary strategies. In turn, if successful, an IT regime can shift inward the Taylor curve of inflation-output volatility trade-offs faced by policymakers and contribute to a more effective conduct of monetary policy (see De Gregorio (2022)). The literature, to our knowledge, has paid limited attention to those broader goals, so our paper addresses this important gap.

Leaving aside econometric analyses without comparison groups, one important strand of the literature has mostly used difference-in-differences (DID) estimators and propensity score methods to evaluate the causal effects of IT on observed inflation rates. Those studies, however, obtain rather mixed results on causality. Instead, we adopt a purely agnostic viewpoint about the effectiveness of IT and use recently proposed synthetic control (SC) methods for causal inference to test whether IT matters in a (large) sample of AEs and EMDEs. In doing so, we avoid important issues in this literature: the absence of parallel trends and equal weights of control units usually assumed in DID estimations, and the small number of control units that does not allow accurate estimates by propensity score matching methods.¹ We also deal with several empirical obstacles such as different treatment periods, selection of control groups and methodological limitations with great care.

We use the SC approach comprehensively summarized in Abadie (2021), jointly with a

¹For a useful exposition on these and other empirical issues related to the use of DID and propensity score matching methods to evaluate IT effectiveness, see Lee (2011).

careful selection of treated units and control groups. To improve the pre-treatment fit of the synthetic estimates, we employ the intercept-shifted SC method suggested by [Doudchenko and Imbens \(2016\)](#) and formalized by [Ferman and Pinto \(2021\)](#). After discarding synthetic units with weak pre-treatment fit, our final sample contains 23 treated units (9 AEs and 14 EMDEs) and a set of potential comparison units (17 AEs and 50 EMDEs) covering different available samples over the 1980:Q1 – 2018:Q4 pre-pandemic period. Using this dataset and the above-mentioned SC techniques, we find the following.

First, IT has been effective in reducing the level of the inflation rate compared with the counterfactuals in most countries (at least 5 AEs and 11 EMDEs). However, consistent with much of the existing literature, the gains of disinflation are modest—especially among AEs—and statistically significant in just a few of the treated units (notably, Canada, U.K., Colombia, Hungary, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand). Interestingly, Japan—a country that has been coping with deflation for a long period of time—achieved a significantly higher (positive) inflation rate after the adoption of IT. In the group of EMDEs, the reductions are relatively substantial in the short and even over the medium term.

Second, we find strong evidence that adopting IT can be effective at achieving macroeconomic stabilization gains irrespective of whether the ITCB was successful in lowering (or raising, in some cases) the inflation rate level. We compare the dispersion of the actual and synthetic inflation rates around the target point or the midpoint of the target band, while controlling by the degree of pre-treatment fit. Using exact inference, we find statistically significant differences in about three out of five economies over the full post-intervention.

Third, IT could be useful to lock in the beneficial effects of price stabilization even during severe crisis episodes. We investigate the resilience of the IT framework to help stabilize inflation in response to the large 2007 commodity price shocks (oil and food commodities) and the subsequent 2007 – 09 GFC. Our evidence on economic resilience shows sizeable differences among AEs and EMDEs. There are virtually no statistical gains in shifting the level of inflation for AEs and only one in four countries achieved lower volatility around the target than in the counterfactual. By contrast, statistical gains among EMDEs are quite sizeable reaching two out of five economies for the shift in the inflation level and two out of three economies for the volatility around the target, respectively.

Fourth, we find that measures of IT effectiveness—in terms of the level and the volatility of inflation around its target—are statistically related to indices of exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence, especially among EMDEs. We analyze other potential covariates such as indices of financial and trade openness and central bank independence. ITCBs that are more (monetary policy) independent from their *dominant* foreign counterpart

(often the U.S.), other things equal, tend to enjoy an improved ability to control inflation around the target. Similarly, within a fairly flexible exchange rate regime, more stable exchange rates are associated with ITCBs that can lower the inflation level and its variability more effectively. Our evidence suggests, however, that there are limits to the gains IT can achieve keeping both (low) inflation and exchange rates stable—reflecting the constraints imposed by the impossibility trilemma of international finance ([Aizenman \(2019\)](#)).

Finally, our study contributes to the existing IT literature in different methodological ways too. The paper provides causal inference on the adoption of IT using a global perspective and SC methods with a much larger sample size than that of prior studies. For example, economies with IT regimes such as Iceland, Japan, Norway, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Romania, and Serbia have not been evaluated as treated units in any previous study, even among those that use causality techniques (see, e.g., [Ball \(2010\)](#); [Lee \(2011\)](#); and [Barbosa et al. \(2018\)](#)). We propose a new approach to measure the effectiveness of IT in maintaining inflation close to target, exploiting the actual and synthetic inflation rates, and assessing its significance by using exact inference procedures as in [Abadie et al. \(2010\)](#), [Abadie et al. \(2011\)](#), and [Abadie et al. \(2015\)](#). Moreover, we also propose an evaluation of IT as a tool to lock in the benefits of previous disinflations and improve resilience, specifically for the case when the economy was hit by large shocks during the 2007 commodity price boom and the 2007 – 09 GFC. With few exceptions, tests of IT resilience have been previously omitted.²

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. [Section 2](#) discusses the design and the data. This part includes the hypotheses, theoretical issues, brief comments on related findings, the definition of the intervention, and features of the dataset. [Section 3](#) describes the empirical strategy. [Section 4](#) reports the main results, tests, and robustness checks. [Section 5](#) explores potential covariates of our measures of IT effectiveness and provides some discussion of the policy and modeling implications of our findings. [Section 6](#) concludes with some final remarks. More details on our strategy to define treated and control groups can be found in [Appendix A](#), a description of the dataset of covariates in [Appendix B](#), and additional results in [Appendix C](#).

²For studies that propose a similar idea without a formal hypothesis test, see [Mishkin and Posen \(1997\)](#), [Corbo et al. \(2002\)](#), and [Bernanke et al. \(2018\)](#). [Fratzscher et al. \(2020\)](#) find that economies with IT regimes show lower inflation rates after a large natural disaster compared with economies with alternative monetary regimes. [Angeriz and Arestis \(2008\)](#) provide empirical evidence that suggests that both ITCBs and (two) non-ITCBs are equally successful in locking in low inflation rates.

2 Design and Data

2.1 Assessing the IT framework performance

The related empirical literature traditionally has focused on the hypothesis that the adoption of an IT regime with a (credible) target inflation below (above) the current inflation rate induces a corresponding level shift in short and long run realized inflation. The usual transmission mechanism cited in the literature works through inflation expectations (Ball and Sheridan (2004); Vega and Winkelried (2005); Gürkaynak et al. (2007); Batini and Laxton (2007); Svensson (2009); Lin and Ye (2009); Miao (2009); Walsh (2009); Ball (2010); Tillmann (2012); Ardakani et al. (2018); Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2019); Huang et al. (2019); Ravenna and Ingholt (2021)). When economic agents (households and firms) believe the central bank’s commitment to maintaining inflation close to target, their expectations and behavior align accordingly, altering the inflation level as a result.

IT operates through other channels as well, separate from expectations. The macroeconomic performance of an IT regime depends on how policy is implemented (e.g., the mix of policy tools and communication used by the central bank, the strength of the anti-inflation bias of its policy response) and on key features of the economy (e.g., the price and wage setting behavior, the structure and linkages of the economy).³

We do not attempt to distinguish across transmission channels. Instead, we question the evidential gains (if any) of adopting IT as a monetary policy strategy irrespective of differences in the toolkit, communication approach or economic structure. While we recognize that different ITCBs face potentially disparate policy trade-offs, we hone in on the empirical effects that switching to IT has on the dynamics of inflation as that is IT’s stated goal.

We also focus on two hypotheses that—to our knowledge—have so far received less attention in the literature than the possible level effects of IT. We hypothesize that the effective deployment of an IT regime can result in both lower variability of the realized inflation around the pre-announced target and enhanced resilience when subject to some large shocks (e.g., the 2007 commodity price boom and 2007 – 09 GFC) due to several interrelated reasons:

Anchored inflation expectations: With well-anchored inflation expectations, economic agents trust that the central bank will act to keep inflation stable and accordingly anticipate inflation close to target, reducing inflation volatility. Moreover, Ascari and Sbor-

³For example, the exchange-rate pass-through channel for small open economies (Coulibaly and Kempf (2010); Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2019); Ha et al. (2019)), including many of the IT adopters in our sample. If the inflation target is credible and dampens the pass-through coefficient, domestic and external shocks that hit the nominal exchange rate produce more muted changes in domestic inflation dynamics.

done (2014) and Ascari et al. (2017) show through the lens of a generalized New Keynesian model with non-zero long-run inflation that an increase in the inflation trend—which the ITCB aims to anchor with its target—is “associated with a more volatile and unstable economy and tends to destabilize inflation expectations.” Hence, theory suggests that there exists an economically significant relationship between the numerical target set under IT and the volatility gains that can be achieved.

Reduced inflation bias: The inflation bias arises from discretionary policymaking whenever central banks are tempted to renege on their commitments to price stability to exploit short-term trade-offs between inflation and economic activity (the so-called “time inconsistency” problem of Kydland and Prescott (1977)). This can be partly mitigated under IT because, as Bernanke (2003) notes, an IT regime is effectively a framework of “constrained discretion” in monetary policymaking that mixes elements of both “rules” (an explicit numerical target to anchor inflation over the medium-term) and “discretion” (to respond to economic shocks in the short-term). Hence, an ITCB can achieve lower volatility by restricting discretionary policies to a degree.⁴

Enhanced credibility and accountability: A binding commitment to a (numerical) inflation target, which is explicitly announced and verifiable, can lead to better outcomes by making monetary policy more credible and predictable (Kydland and Prescott (1977)). It can also enhance its effectiveness as economic agents have confidence that inflation will be kept in check, thus contributing to further reduce volatility. Moreover, central banks are often held accountable for delivering on their inflation commitments. Easy verification and accountability reinforce the credibility of the IT regime and strengthen the policymakers’ incentives to take appropriate actions that lower volatility.

Improved transparency: An IT regime often comes with increased transparency so economic agents more easily understand communications and policy actions (Bernanke (2003); Cole and Martínez-García (2023)). Lower volatility follows partly because clear communications help economic agents make better-informed decisions, reducing uncertainty about future inflation. Central banks can more effectively manage expectations when policy is framed in terms of (or in relation to) the policy rate—under a degree of exchange rate flexibility—and often aided with the publication of inflation forecasts and projections.

⁴Strategies with an explicit monetary or exchange rate target can also constrain the central bank’s discretion, but can conflict with the goal of IT—the latter one by directly confronting the central bank with the limitations of the trilemma of international finance when coupled with capital mobility (Aizenman (2019)). Successful ITCBs tend to exclude multiple target commitments and narrowly focus on inflation.

2.2 Intervention and intervened units

To determine the intervention effect, we need first to define what inflation targeting (IT) is. The classification of ITCBs is not fully clear (Dueker and Fischer (2006); Blinder et al. (2008)), and even less clear for EMDEs. There are a number of definitions proposed in the literature. For starters, we concern ourselves with IT regimes that target low and stable inflation alone.⁵ We leave the exploration of flexible IT with multiple competing objectives—e.g., putting weight on stabilizing real output as well (Svensson (2010))—for future research.

Based on the arguments laid out in Subsection 2.1, we classify central banks as ITCBs if they closely align their monetary policy framework with the rationale for IT. More precisely, a treated unit—an ITCB—should satisfy the following conditions (e.g., Mishkin (2000); Sterne (2002); Truman (2003); Little and Romano (2009)):

1. The explicit acknowledgment of the adoption of an inflation-targeting regime by the monetary authority or its legally binding incorporation in the central bank’s statutes.
2. The periodic announcement of an explicit numerical inflation target some periods ahead (Svensson (2008); Svensson (2010)). Aside from a price index, this framework includes the specification of either a target inflation level, a target band on inflation, or both. A tolerance band may or may not be added to the numerical inflation target.⁶
3. The use of a policy rate or key interest rate as the primary instrument for policymaking coupled with a degree of exchange rate flexibility and, accordingly, the absence of an explicit monetary aggregate target, exchange rate target, or a combination of both (Jonas and Mishkin (2004); Jahan (2012)).⁷
4. The publication of inflation forecasts and other relevant indicators as well as the use of accountability mechanisms for attaining its inflation objectives (Debelle (1997); Fracasso et al. (2003); Roger (2009); Svensson (2010); Frascaroli and Nobrega (2019)).

⁵As Debelle (1997) puts it, “the distinctive feature of the inflation targeting countries is that the inflation rate is the over-riding objective of monetary policy.” However, a sole mandate to achieve price stability is not a sufficient condition to become an ITCB (Schaechter et al. (2000)).

⁶A target interval is a range of values that the monetary authority targets, while a tolerance band is a range of permissible outcomes that do not constitute part of the central bank’s objective. The differences between a target interval (with or without a target midpoint) and a target point do not seem to matter in practice because the edges of the interval are usually viewed as “soft edges” when values outside the range do not imply immediate policy action (Svensson (2010)).

⁷The toolkit of monetary policy was used more broadly during and after zero lower bound episodes, but policy itself was still framed in reference to and in support of the policy rate path. The deployment of multiple instruments would be, therefore, still in keeping with Condition 3.

We verify the IT adoption date and the requirements of our IT definition given by [Condition 1](#) to [Condition 4](#)—whether the central bank acknowledges IT explicitly, publishes forecasts, uses an accountability mechanism, and sets a policy rate while operating with some exchange rate flexibility—by consulting central bank documents and other official sources. The post-intervention period starts at the IT adoption date and ends at the last period available within our sample (2018:Q4) or when the country abandoned the IT regime.

We discard multilateral and unilateral currency unions (e.g., fully dollarized nations, the Euro zone, etc.), currency boards, and other hard pegs (pre-announced horizontal bands narrower than or equal to $\pm 2\%$, and *de facto* pegs) based on [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#)'s coarse exchange rate regime classification. When a country is classified as such, then its central bank is no longer an ITCB and that affects the post-intervention period length.

To be part of our analysis, every intervened unit (ITCB) should have at least 16 quarters of pre-intervention period and 12 quarters of post-intervention period. We exclude 5 countries with an IT regime based on [Condition 1](#) to [Condition 4](#) that lack an adequate minimum number of post-treatment periods: Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Jamaica, and Ukraine.

Several definitions used in the literature imply sets of ITCBs that mostly coincide with ours. However, our IT definition is not set in stone. We perform robustness checks and include other potential candidates that do not satisfy some of the conditions in our definition (more on this in [Subsection 4.3](#)). Partial implementation of IT or a quasi-IT regime can diminish the central bank's effectiveness to control inflation. We identify 4 countries with a quasi-IT regime: Spain, Switzerland, the U.S., and Uruguay.

Given all of that, our initial set of treated units (ITCBs) based on [Condition 1](#) to [Condition 4](#) consists of 38 economies: 12 AEs and 26 EMDEs that adopted an explicit IT regime coupled with some degree of exchange rate flexibility. [Table A1](#), [Table A2](#), and [Table A3](#) in [Appendix A](#) provide more detailed information about the IT features adopted by each central bank and their respective IT adoption dates.

[Table A4](#) in [Appendix A](#) also sheds light on the various reasons that could lead central banks to adopt an IT regime according to their own reports and statements complemented with other sources. Although the list is non-exhaustive, it suggests that ITCBs prefer to adopt this framework to lock in inflation or assure price stability (18 out of 38). The second reason mentioned is the objective of achieving a lower inflation rate (14 out of 38).

The two main reasons are therefore broadly consistent with the hypotheses we address in this paper. Other reasons stated include anchoring economic agents' expectations, dissatisfaction with previous monetary arrangements, more transparency, accountability, independence of monetary policy, preparing for another monetary arrangement, etc.

2.3 Donor pools

The identification of appropriate donor pools starts by considering units that are not in the treated sets. The members of the treated and the control groups are listed in [Appendix A](#). The donor pool for the treated group of AEs has 16 AEs and 4 EMDEs. The latter are Algeria, Bangladesh, Iran, and Malaysia. We include these economies because they are neighbors of certain treated AEs and can capture potential regional shocks on domestic inflation ([Neely and Rapach \(2011\)](#); [Mumtaz et al. \(2011\)](#)). This also reflects that we have treated AEs in different world regions including Asia (e.g., Israel, Japan, South Korea) and Oceania (e.g., Australia, New Zealand). Furthermore, some of the AEs are relatively small commodity-exporting economies subject to external demand and supply shocks.

The donor pool for the treated group of EMDEs includes 50 EMDEs. In general, we disregard economies with an insufficient number of observations and that have experienced hyperinflationary episodes (e.g., Venezuela, Zimbabwe). Note that the donor pools have 4 units in common. All the countries that adopted IT prior to 2019, even those excluded in the treated groups because of the small number of post-intervention periods, are not part of the donor pools. We verify the sensitivity of our results to alternative formulations of our baseline donor pools in [Subsection 4.3](#) (robustness checks).

It is worth adding that member states of the euro area are part of the donor pools and not of the treated groups since they are classified as a hard peg with no separate legal tender—a currency union—by [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#).

2.4 Outcome variable

The outcome variable is the percent 4-quarter log-change in the (seasonally-adjusted) headline consumer price index, that is $\pi_t \equiv 100 \cdot (\ln CPI_t - \ln CPI_{t-4})$. Although not every ITCB targets the CPI (e.g., the South African Reserve Bank), this standard index is tracked by most of the ITCBs and non-ITCBs to gauge price stability. The data source is [Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#) complemented with national sources in some cases. We consider countries that have CPI data fully available over the 1980:Q1 – 2018:Q4 period. The exceptions are Albania, Czech Republic, Serbia, and post-Soviet states such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

The upper panel of [Table 1](#) reports summary statistics for the original list of IT AEs and EMDEs, both before and after the adoption of IT. We discuss the final sample of treated groups (lower panel of the table) in [Subsection 4.1](#) below. The mean, median, and coefficient of variation of the inflation rates show a drop in both samples and across treated groups.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Inflation Rates

	Advanced economies	Emerging market and developing economies
	All IT units	
<u>Pre-IT regime periods</u>		
Mean	8.54	29.53
Median	4.40	11.67
Standard deviation	17.83	55.64
Coefficient of variation	2.09	1.88
N	893	2267
<u>Post-IT regime periods</u>		
Mean	2.50	4.97
Median	2.04	4.25
Standard deviation	2.28	3.47
Coefficient of variation	0.91	0.70
N	995	1354
Cross-sectional units	12	26
Final treated groups		
<u>Pre-IT regime periods</u>		
Mean	6.28	21.39
Median	4.45	10.06
Standard deviation	8.20	42.22
Coefficient of variation	1.31	1.97
N	579	1165
<u>Post-IT regime periods</u>		
Mean	2.33	4.28
Median	2.05	3.82
Standard deviation	1.87	3.08
Coefficient of variation	0.80	0.72
N	745	871
Cross-sectional units	9	14

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Statistics are calculated over the 1981:Q1 – 2018:Q4 period. For the full list of countries in the upper panel, see [Table A1](#) or [Table A2](#) in [Appendix A](#). In the lower panel (Final treated groups), we discard the treated units with weak pre-treatment fit (AEs (3): Israel, New Zealand, and Slovak Rep.; EMDEs (12): Armenia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Turkey, and Uganda). See also [Table A3](#) in [Appendix A](#) for more on the IT adoption periods.

3 Empirical Strategy

3.1 The estimation method

The seminal SC method was proposed by [Abadie and Gardeazabal \(2003\)](#) and developed in a series of papers by [Abadie et al. \(2010\)](#), [Abadie et al. \(2011\)](#), and [Abadie et al. \(2015\)](#). It involves constructing a synthetic control unit by combining weighted averages of similar untreated units, with the goal of creating a counterfactual that closely resembles the treated unit in terms of relevant characteristics.

To improve the pre-treatment fit of the synthetic estimates, we employ the intercept-shifted SC method of [Doudchenko and Imbens \(2016\)](#) and [Ferman and Pinto \(2021\)](#). We follow the notation from those articles in this section. Given that this method is well understood, our discussion here will be brief. Consider a sample of $J + 1$ (cross-sectional) units, each indexed by j . We label unit $j = 1$ as the treated unit, whereas units $j = 2, \dots, J + 1$ constitute the “donor pool” (the potential control units). All units are observed between periods 1 and T . The intervention period starts at T_0 and ends at T such that $1 < T_0 < T$.

The dynamic treatment effect (DTE) occurring at a given time $t \geq T_0$ on the treated unit ($j = 1$) can be represented by

$$\tau_{1t} = \pi_{1t} - \pi_{1t}^N \tag{1}$$

where π_{1t} is the (demeaned) outcome variable—the inflation rate—of the unit exposed to the intervention, π_{1t}^N is the (demeaned) outcome that would be observed for unit 1 at time t in the absence of the intervention. The SC method proposes to construct the counterfactual by using a weighted average of the J control units: $\pi_{1t}^N = \sum_{j=2}^{J+1} w_j \pi_{jt}$, for $t \geq T_0$, where $0 \leq w_j \leq 1$ for $j \geq 2$ and $w_2 + w_3 + \dots + w_{J+1} = 1$. In words, no unit receives a negative weight, but can receive a zero weight and the sum of all weights equals one. That weighted average is the synthetic control. Thus, we can obtain an estimate of the DTE as $\hat{\tau}_{1t} = \pi_{1t} - \hat{\pi}_{1t}^N$. The outcome variable is demeaned by subtracting the pre-treatment average of the outcome variable from the actual outcome variable for every treated and untreated unit and every period ([Ferman and Pinto \(2021\)](#)).⁸

⁸When we construct the demeaned outcome variables for each period of the full sample, we subtract the corresponding sample mean calculated only over the pre-intervention period from the raw outcome variable. This is not the mean of the full sample and cannot be regarded as a measure of a (constant) long-run inflation rate. The idea of demeaning seeks to reduce the imbalance by removing a fixed effect from each unit’s outcome variable, which is implicitly assumed to be zero in the standard SC method. This individual fixed effect might contain a combination of various time-invariant idiosyncratic characteristics.

The weights \hat{w}_j are obtained so that the resulting SC best resembles the pre-treatment values for the treated unit of predictors of the outcome variable (Abadie (2021)). In our study, we include only pre-treatment values of the outcome variable as predictors. We use one value of the outcome as predictor every other pre-treatment period and check sensitivity to the inclusion of more pretreatment values in Subsection 4.3. Past inflation tends to work as a good predictor of present and future inflation in random walks, autoregressive, and more general models (see Atkeson and Ohanian (2001); Duncan and Martínez-García (2019)).

Under some regularity conditions, Abadie et al. (2010) demonstrate that the SC estimator is asymptotically unbiased.⁹ More precisely, Abadie et al. (2010) show that the asymptotic unbiasedness holds if the number of pre-treatment periods is large relative to the scale of the transitory shocks. Moreover, the number of post-treatment periods should also be sufficiently large so the treatment can have an effect on the outcome. For these reasons, we try to maximize the period of analysis and require at least 16 quarters of pre-intervention period and 12 quarters of post-intervention period. All the units in the final treated group satisfy these pre-requisites. Within the final set of treated units, only two of them reach the lower bounds: Serbia (16-quarter pre-treatment period) and India (12-quarter post-treatment period). All remaining units have longer pre-treatment and post-treatment periods.¹⁰

3.2 Average treatment effect on the treated unit

Once the DTE is estimated for each post-intervention period, we can calculate the average treatment effect (ATT) on the treated unit for different periods of width L :

$$\widehat{ATT}_L = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} \hat{\tau}_{1t}, \quad (2)$$

where $L = t_2 - t_1 + 1$ and $T_0 \leq t_1 < t_2 \leq T$. For each treated unit, we are particularly interested in (i) the short-term effects over the first three years that followed the IT implementation (i.e., $L = 12$ quarters and $t_1 = T_0$); (ii) the medium-term effects over the first five post-intervention years ($L = 20$ and $t_1 = T_0$); (iii) the full post-intervention period ($t_1 = T_0$ and $t_2 = T$); and (iv) the 2007 – 09 GFC period ($L = 12$ and $t_1 = 2007:Q1$).

We address the significance of the treatment effects via the distribution of the ratios

⁹In addition, Ferman and Pinto (2021) show that the demeaned version of the SC method can significantly reduce the bias and variance relative to the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator.

¹⁰Our work shares the estimation method with Lee (2011) and Barbosa et al. (2018), but there are important differences regarding the sample of study, the definition of the treatment, choice and number of treated and untreated units, research questions, IT effectiveness measures, inference, and results.

between the post-intervention RMSPE and pre-intervention RMSPE for each unit. For unit j , such a ratio is

$$r_j = \frac{R_j(T_0 + 1, T)}{R_j(1, T_0)}, \quad (3)$$

with $R_j(\cdot)$ defined for $1 \leq t_1 \leq t_2 \leq T$ and $j = \{1, \dots, J + 1\}$ as

$$R_j(t_1, t_2) = \left[\frac{1}{t_2 - t_1 + 1} \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} (\pi_{jt} - \widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N)^2 \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (4)$$

where $\widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N$ is the outcome variable estimated by a SC in a given period t , when unit j is coded as the treated unit, and using all other J units to form the donor pool. Thus, the statistic r_j measures the quality of the fit of a SC for unit j in the post-treatment period, relative to the quality of the fit in the pre-treatment period. [Abadie et al. \(2010\)](#) use the permutation distribution of r_j for inference.

We run placebo studies by iteratively applying the SC method to every unit in the donor pool that did not implement IT during the sample period. In each iteration, we reassign artificially the policy intervention to one of the comparison units, shifting the intervened unit to the donor pool. We then compute the estimated effect associated with each placebo run. This iterative procedure provides us with a distribution of estimated gaps for the units where no intervention took place. For a significant effect, we wish to obtain the largest post-intervention RMSPE and the lowest pre-intervention RMSPE.

The corresponding p-value from the permutation distribution of r_j is defined by [Abadie \(2021\)](#) as:

$$p_j = \frac{1}{J + 1} \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} I_+(r_j - r_1), \quad (5)$$

where $I_+(\cdot)$ is an indicator function equal to 1 if the argument is non-negative, 0 otherwise.

We also use the one-sided test for positive and negative gaps only by replacing $(\pi_{jt} - \widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N)$ in $R_j(T_0 + 1, T)$ with their positive, $(\pi_{jt} - \widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N)^+$, or negative, $(\pi_{jt} - \widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N)^-$, counterparts. As [Abadie \(2021\)](#) shows, one-tailed inference may result in significant gains of statistical power.

3.3 A new measure and test of IT effectiveness

A central bank that adopts an IT regime might seek a lower or, in some cases, a higher inflation rate. Most importantly, an ITCB is interested in keeping inflation controlled around the desired inflation target. We propose an indicator to measure the dispersion around the target point. This indicator compares the root mean squared deviations (*RMSD*) of the

observed inflation rate from the target value (or the midpoint of the IT band, π^T) with an analogous statistic calculated using the synthetic inflation rate instead. For a given treated unit ($j = 1$), we define the following ratio:

$$DEV = \frac{RMSD(\pi_j; t_1, t_2 | \pi_1^T) - RMSD(\widehat{\pi}_j^N; t_1, t_2 | \pi_1^T)}{R_j(1, T_0)}, \quad (6)$$

where $T_0 \leq t_1 < t_2 \leq T$, $j = 1, \dots, J + 1$. The components of the numerator are defined as

$$RMSD(\pi_j; t_1, t_2 | \pi_1^T) = \left[\frac{1}{t_2 - t_1 + 1} \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} (\pi_{jt} - \pi_{1t}^T)^2 \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (7)$$

$$RMSD(\widehat{\pi}_j^N; t_1, t_2 | \pi_1^T) = \left[\frac{1}{t_2 - t_1 + 1} \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} (\widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N - \pi_{1t}^T)^2 \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}. \quad (8)$$

We include the pre-treatment RMSPE in the denominator of our indicator to penalize for the pre-treatment imbalance. Under the null hypothesis of no effectiveness, the ratio equals zero—the observed and counterfactual variability of the inflation rate around the target are the same. The lower the first component of the numerator, the more effective is IT in keeping inflation close to its target. But, it could be the case that without the IT intervention, the counterfactual inflation could have also been similarly close to target (the second component could approach zero as well). In turn, we expect the numerator (and by extension the ratio) to display a negative sign as an indication of IT effectiveness. Statistically speaking, we use the distribution of ratios as in the placebo study discussed above to verify that the difference between both elements in the numerator scaled by the pre-treatment fit measure in the denominator is significant. As in the case of the ATTs, we calculate the one-sided test for negative differences to gain statistical power.

One advantage of the DEV indicator over the ATT is that it is simpler to interpret in terms of IT effectiveness. We should expect different signs of the ATT if an ITCB seeks lower inflation (e.g., Poland) or higher inflation (e.g., Japan) than in the corresponding counterfactual. Moreover, it is not clear whether the ATT provides meaningful information about IT effectiveness—adopting IT might aim to keep inflation stable and to lock in the already low inflation rather than to shift the inflation rate level (e.g., Norway). By contrast, for the case of our proposed DEV ratio, a negative sign would indicate that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to target under IT than could be expected given our estimated counterfactual inflation rate in the absence of the IT intervention. That would be an unequivocal indication of the better volatility performance of the IT regime.

4 Results

4.1 Pre-treatment fit and synthetic weights

As in other SC studies, the degree of fit over the pre-treatment period is an issue. Our exercise is particularly challenging because of the high level of volatility and noise in the inflationary processes of AEs and, particularly, among EMDEs during the 1980s and 1990s. To reduce the risk of matching noise, we employ the demeaned SC method. In certain cases, we also restrict the pre-intervention period by removing some periods of large persistent fluctuations over the initial part of the sample (e.g., Australia, Peru, and Serbia). If the pre-treatment fit is poor, [Abadie \(2021\)](#) recommends not to use the SC method.¹¹

[Table A5](#) in [Appendix A](#) provides measures of pre-treatment fit for all the IT economies: the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), the mean absolute prediction error (MAPE), and the MAPE re-scaled by the standard deviation (SD) ([Hollingsworth and Wing \(2020\)](#)), all calculated over the pre-intervention period. To the best of our knowledge, the literature on the SC method does not propose an optimal procedure to determine what a “very good” pre-treatment fit is. We choose conventional thresholds and constrain our analysis to units with RMSPE lower than 3 p.p. and an MAPE-to-SD ratio lower than 0.5.¹² With those cut-offs, we did not obtain reasonable fits for the inflationary processes of 15 countries. We opted to remove those units from the main analysis.

Our conclusions are based on the results from the final treated groups composed of 9 AEs and 14 EMDEs with relatively better pre-treatment balance.¹³

4.2 Main findings

4.2.1 Estimated average ATT

As a preliminary look at the results at an aggregate level, [Table 2](#) provides summary statistics of the estimated ATTs for both groups of countries. We report the mean, median, minimum, and maximum ATT across the units in each treated group. In addition, [Table 2](#) includes the weighted mean ATT (see [Acemoglu et al. \(2016\)](#)). This is the weighted average of the units’

¹¹A (very) good pre-intervention fit is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a proper SC estimation due to the risk of over-fitting (see [Abadie and Vives-i-Bastida \(2022\)](#)).

¹²Based on the propensity score matching literature, [Hollingsworth and Wing \(2020\)](#) recommend ignoring units with a MAPE-to-SD ratio larger than 0.25. Considering the high volatility of our outcome variable pre-IT, particularly among EMDEs, we relax the cut-off, choosing a value of 0.5 for our study.

¹³Figures with the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates plus tables of estimated weights for each synthetic unit can be found in [Appendix C](#).

ATTs. Each weight is an inverse function of the corresponding pre-treatment RMSPE. The idea here is that those units that show better pre-intervention balance contribute more to the calculation of the average.

The table also presents the summary statistics of the ATTs for different post-intervention sub-periods: the first 12 quarters, the first 20 quarters, the full post-treatment period, and the 2007 – 09 period, whenever the treated unit’s outcome is observed over this episode. In the latter case, that we use to analyze resilience, 8 AEs and 12 EMDEs implemented IT during the twelve quarters of 2007 – 09. The remaining economies implemented IT during such an episode or after 2009 (Albania, Japan, and India). The Slovak Republic had an IT regime that ended in 2008:Q4.

Two observations are worth pointing out. First, using the simple mean as the measure of central location, we find that IT was mostly followed by reductions in the inflation rate among AEs and EMDEs. Such declines are modest in the developed world—lower than 0.5 p.p. over the first three years and five years—and almost negligible over the full post-intervention period. Among EMDEs, the average reduction in inflation fluctuates in the range of 2.1 and 3.5 p.p. per year. Second, economies that implemented IT regimes before 2007 were able to cushion the external shocks related to the 2007 commodity price shocks (oil and food commodities) and the 2007 – 09 GFC. Although the average gains in lower inflation are almost negligible in AEs (0.3 p.p.), EMDEs achieved average inflation gains close to 5 p.p. with respect to the comparison group.

At this point, we can compare our results to findings on AEs and EMDEs in the existing literature. [Ball and Sheridan \(2004\)](#) (Table 6.3, p. 258), for instance, estimate that the average inflation rate shows a (statistically insignificant) fall of 0.55 p.p. for 7 AEs that adopted IT. [Vega and Winkelried \(2005\)](#) (Table 3, p. 170) conclude that the gains in lower inflation are significant and can reach 2.8 p.p. in AEs and 4.9 in EMDEs. [Lin and Ye \(2007\)](#) (Table 3, p. 2528) show that IT has an average estimated ATT of -0.17 p.p. in 7 AEs. In contrast, [Lin and Ye \(2009\)](#) (Table 4, p. 121) report that the average estimated ATT is -2.97 p.p. across various estimators in 13 EMDEs. Depending on the set of estimation methods, [de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza \(2012\)](#) (Table 6, p. 187) find that average ATTs are insignificant and close to zero for 12 AEs but about -5 p.p. for 17 EMDEs. These empirical studies differ in sample size, periods of analysis, and estimation techniques, but qualitatively and even quantitatively they obtained ATT results that are similar to ours.

Table 2. Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units - Summary Statistics

	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period
Advanced economies				
Mean	-0.21	-0.29	0.07	0.28
Weighted mean	-0.57	-0.65	-0.04	-0.12
Median	-0.37	-0.28	-0.45	-0.47
Min	-3.51	-2.76	-1.49	-1.94
Max	1.69	1.78	3.02	7.48
N (ATT<0)	5	5	5	5
N (ATT≥0)	4	4	4	3
N	9	9	9	8
Emerging market and developing economies				
Mean	-2.06	-3.96	-3.46	-4.75
Weighted mean	-1.51	-2.14	-2.68	-3.50
Median	-1.71	-1.66	-1.96	-2.77
Min	-10.32	-21.58	-10.21	-12.80
Max	3.83	1.55	3.28	0.35
N (ATT<0)	10	10	12	11
N (ATT≥0)	4	2	2	1
N	14	12	14	12

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The statistics (mean, median, minimum, and maximum) are calculated across the number of treated units (N) in each group of countries (over the first 3 years, 5 years, and full post-treatment period). The treated units in this table include only those ITCBs that have "good pre-treatment fit" (RMSPE < 3, MAPE/SD < 0.5). Some units were not treated during the 2007 – 09 period. For the IT adoption periods, see [Table A1](#), [Table A2](#), and [Table A3](#) in [Appendix A](#). ATT denotes the average treatment effect on the treated units. ATTs for first 3 or 5 years estimates the ATT over the first 12 or 20 quarters (or the number of available quarters within the first 12 or 20 quarters of the post-treatment period). The weighted mean ATT is the weighted average of the units' ATTs whose weights are constructed using the inverse of the pre-treatment RMSPEs (see [Acemoglu et al. \(2016\)](#)). N (ATT < 0) indicates the number of units with ATT < 0. N (ATT ≥ 0) indicates the number of units with ATT ≥ 0.

4.2.2 Heterogeneity in ATTs

Beyond the averages, we also verify the heterogeneity across countries. [Figure 1](#) and [Figure 2](#) display the ATT estimates over the four periods of the post-intervention for each AE and EMDE. We find statistically significant ATTs in about 40% (10 out of 24) of the countries at the 10% significance level using the corresponding one-sided test to improve statistical power (see also columns First 20Q and Full Post-T in [Table 3](#)). In particular, significant effects are observed in 3 out of the 9 AEs and in 7 out of the 14 EMDEs in at least one of

the sub-periods of analysis. Statistically significant gains in lower inflation over the first 3 (and 5) years or the full post-intervention period are found in Canada and the U.K. among AEs, and Colombia, Hungary, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand among EMDEs. Japan—prone to deflationary episodes—reached a significantly higher (positive) inflation rate after the adoption of IT than in the counterfactual; an outcome closer to the Bank of Japan’s stated goal ([Shirakawa \(2012\)](#)). The mixed effectiveness of IT on inflation levels in our sample is consistent with the mixed evidence in previous studies (e.g., [Ball and Sheridan \(2004\)](#); [Lin and Ye \(2007\)](#); [Gonçalves and Salles \(2008\)](#); [Lin and Ye \(2009\)](#)).

Broadly speaking, we find in [Table 3](#) that EMDEs have successfully pursued lower inflation with the adoption of an IT regime; by contrast, most AEs have implemented their IT regime primarily for other purposes (like building resilience or to stabilize inflation around the target) rather than to shift the level of inflation, as the ATT performance result shows.¹⁴ We discuss those other performance dimensions and how EMDEs and AEs have fared after adopting IT in the remainder of the paper.


As we mentioned above, the SC method can deal with omitted-variable bias by accounting for the presence of time-varying unobservable confounders ([Billmeier and Nannicini \(2013\)](#)). However, as in most policy evaluations using observational data, the SC method does not deal with all possible sources of endogeneity bias such as that from reverse causation ([Billmeier and Nannicini \(2013\)](#); [Adhikari et al. \(2018\)](#)). Although we are cautious in the interpretation of our reported results, we put little weight on the reverse causality concern for two reasons. First, it is less likely to observe this kind of bias if we are matching the unobservable heterogeneity adequately using the SC estimation. Let us recall that we discard all the treated units with (very) weak pre-intervention balance, which helps maximize the chances of unbiasedness of our SC estimates. Second, [Table A4](#) in [Appendix A](#) suggests that in fact ITCBs adopted IT for a variety of reasons other than to lower (increase) the inflation rate.

4.2.3 Resilience

We evaluate the resilience hypothesis in both samples as well. The last column of [Table 3](#) displays the ATTs and the statistical significance of the IT performance during the commodity price shocks and the GFC (2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4). We find no causal evidence indicating that IT allows to cushion such global shocks in AEs. By contrast, about 40% (5 out of 12) of the EMDEs obtained disinflationary gains during the same period.

¹⁴In [Appendix C](#), additional tables can be found that complement our analysis about the statistical significance of the ATTs reported in [Table 3](#).


Figure 1. Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units, Advanced Economies



Source: Dallas Fed’s Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors’ calculations.

Note: The figures show the ATT for four periods (from left to right): the first 12 quarters (12Q) of the post-treatment period, the first 20 quarters of the post-treatment period (20Q), the full post-treatment period, and the 2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4 period for those that implemented IT before 2007:Q1. The ordering of economies is from the largest negative ATT to the largest positive one for the full post-treatment period. A negative (positive) value denotes an actual inflation rate below, on average, the estimated counterfactual, which can be interpreted as a gain in lower inflation (or higher inflation for the case of Japan, which is consistent with the Bank of Japan’s objective). Blue diamonds denote the rejection of an ATT equal to zero at 10% significance level in a one-sided placebo test. Gray circles denote statistical insignificance. We label each treated unit with the corresponding 3-digit ISO code for the country in place of its name.

Figure 2. Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units, EMDEs



Source: Dallas Fed’s Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors’ calculations.

Note: The figures show the ATT for four periods (from left to right): the first 12 quarters (12Q) of the post-treatment period, the first 20 quarters of the post-treatment period (20Q), the full post-treatment period, and the 2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4 period for those that implemented IT before 2007:Q1. The ordering of economies is from the largest negative ATT to the largest positive one for the full post-treatment period. A negative (positive) value denotes an actual inflation rate below, on average, the estimated counterfactual, which can be interpreted as a gain in lower inflation. Blue diamonds denote the rejection of an ATT equal to zero at 10% significance level in a one-sided placebo test. Gray circles denote statistical insignificance. We label each treated unit with the corresponding 3-digit ISO code for the country in place of its name.

Table 3. Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units

	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period
Advanced economies				
Australia	-0.88	-0.69	-0.84	-1.94
Canada	-1.38 *	-2.05 *	-0.45 *	-0.64
Czech Republic	1.12	0.22	-0.85	-0.30
Iceland	1.69	1.78	3.02	7.48 **
Japan	1.52 *	1.68 *	1.57 *	NA
Korea, Rep.	-0.48	-0.28	-1.46	-1.89
Norway	0.37	0.11	0.74	0.33
Sweden	-0.37	-0.65	0.39	0.66
United Kingdom	-3.51 *	-2.76 *	-1.49	-1.46
Emerging market and developing economies				
Albania	3.83	NA	3.28	NA
Chile	-10.32	-21.58	-9.73	-6.83
Colombia	-4.90 **	-6.59 **	-10.21 **	-12.80 **
Guatemala	0.55	-0.36	-1.62	-3.08
Hungary	-0.93	-1.50	-2.29 *	-2.47 **
India	-1.12	NA	-0.94	NA
Indonesia	2.08	1.55	-0.86	0.35
Peru	-2.07 **	-1.43 **	-0.24	-1.77
Philippines	-2.19	-2.04	-4.11 *	-7.25 *
Poland	-4.86 *	-5.61 *	-8.67 *	-10.47 **
Romania	-7.24	-7.50	-8.63	-8.41
Serbia	-2.73	-1.81	-4.67	-2.42
South Africa	2.45 *	0.06	-0.40 **	-0.09
Thailand	-1.35 *	-0.77 *	0.64	-1.72 **

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Inference: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, using the corresponding one-sided test. NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps during the entire corresponding period). See also [Appendix C](#) for two-sided and one-sided p-values from placebo runs.

Iceland is an exception of statistical significance among AEs but with a positive ATT (about 7.5 p.p.). The cleanup after the 2008 – 11 financial crisis in Iceland took time, with government blanket guarantees to its banking system completely removed only in 2016 (see [Baudino et al. \(2020\)](#)). The fragility of the Icelandic banking system that came to the forefront after the privately-owned Landsbanki was placed in receivership in October 2008, together with continued market pressures on the Icelandic currency, strained the monetary policy framework of the Central Bank of Iceland for much of the 2010s. The monetary authority tried to keep the currency stable; however, it was ultimately unsuccessful. The rapid depreciation in 2008 added to the domestic inflationary woes through rising import inflation. This series of events likely eroded much of the central bank’s credibility to implement its IT regime, still formally on the books. As a result, the central bank was effectively unable to uphold its IT commitments, leading to poor performance (high inflation).

4.2.4 Inflation dispersion around the target

[Figure 3](#) and [Figure 4](#) show our proposed measure of dispersion around the target point (DEV statistic) for each economy calculated over the four post-treatment (sub-)periods. Mostly, IT adopters show a ratio with a negative sign as expected (see also [Table 4](#)). At conventional significance levels, we observe six cases in which the difference of root mean squared deviations (*RMSD*) is significant in the group of AEs over the first five years or the full post-treatment period: Australia, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K. (6 out of 10). Likewise, there are nine significant cases among EMDEs: Albania, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, and Thailand (9 out of 14). Overall, about 60% (15 out of 24) of the economies in our final sample show significant improvements in the variability of the inflation rate around the desired target after the adoption of IT.

In [Appendix C](#), we compare the ATT and DEV ratio measures of IT effectiveness and show that the correlations are positive and statistically significant for both AEs and EMDEs.

4.3 Robustness checks

4.3.1 Quasi-ITCBs

We include the partial IT experiences of Spain (1995:Q1 – 1998:Q4), Switzerland (2000:Q1 – 2018:Q4), the U.S. (2012:Q1 – 2018:Q4), and Uruguay (2008:Q3 – 2013:Q4) as a robustness in our analysis ([Table A1](#) and [Table A2](#) in [Appendix A](#)). Regarding pre-treatment fit, these quasi-IT economies show RMSPEs lower than 1 (except for Uruguay) and MAPE-to-SD

ratios below 0.5 ([Appendix C](#)). Overall, we judge the quality of the pre-treatment fit to be reasonable and consistent with the standards we imposed on the ITCBs in [Subsection 4.1](#).

The question here is whether these cases that deviate from our defined intervention—that we denominated as quasi-IT—can be successful in reducing inflation and stabilizing the inflation fluctuations around the target. Our findings indicate that the partial implementation of certain features of an IT regime did not result in lower inflation rates or reduced inflation variability around the target. On average, the inflation performance of quasi-IT regimes was similar to that of the estimated counterfactuals.¹⁵ This implies that if a central bank does not satisfy [Condition 1](#) to [Condition 4](#) (as outlined in [Subsection 2.2](#)), simply acting as an ITCB most of the time may not be sufficient to assure private agents that policymakers will refrain from exercising excessive discretion. This limitation hinders quasi-ITCBs’ ability to control inflation, as reflected in the observed data.

4.3.2 Other predictors of the outcome variable

It is useful to analyze the sensitivity of our estimates to the choice of predictors of the outcome variable (see [Abadie \(2021\)](#)). In particular, we evaluate the robustness of the results using a full set of pre-treatment values of the outcome variable. That is, rather than including one pre-treatment outcome every other pre-treatment period, we exploit all the pre-treatment periods to verify if there is any benefit from this additional information.

The results are not largely different from the baseline findings. About 39% (9 out of 23) of the countries experience a lower ATT (higher in Japan) and 61% (14 out of 23) show lower variability of inflation around the target during either the first five years or the full post-intervention period. Similarly, 25% (5 out of 20) of the economies show resilience in terms of lower inflation during 2007 – 09, whereas 55% (11 out of 20) of them show reduced volatility of inflation around the target during the same period (see [Appendix C](#)).^{16,17}

4.3.3 Alternative donor pools

We experiment with alternative donor pools following a recommendation by [Abadie \(2021\)](#). First, we modify the donor pool proposed for the group of AEs down to only its 16 AE

¹⁵We report the ATTs and DEV statistics including the quasi-IT countries in [Appendix C](#). None of the ATTs and DEV ratios are statistically different from zero.

¹⁶Recall that only 8 out of the 9 AEs and 12 out of the 14 EMDEs in our sample had an IT regime during the 2007 – 09 period.

¹⁷If we remove Chile due to a slightly poorer pre-intervention fit ($RMSP E = 3.07 > 3.0$), then 41% (9 out of 22) would show a lower ATT (higher in Japan) and 59% (13 out of 22) would show lower variability. Regarding resilience, the corresponding rates would be 26% (5 out of 19) and 53% (10 out of 19).

countries, removing from the original pool the small number of EMDEs added to better capture regional shocks. For the first five years or the full post-intervention period, we find that the number of treated units with significant shifts in the level of inflation remains the same, whereas the cases of lower inflation volatility around the target diminish to 33% (3 out of 9) (see [Appendix C](#)). That said, this smaller donor pool reduces the pre-intervention fit measured by the RMSPE or the MAPE-to-SD ratio of each AE except for Iceland (see also [Table A5](#) in [Appendix A](#) for the value of these statistics in the baseline scenario). Given this feature, we tend to prefer the baseline results that show a superior pre-treatment fit.

Similarly to [Acemoglu et al. \(2016\)](#), we experiment with an idiosyncratic donor pool, namely, one that is constructed for each treated unit individually. Using the full set of AEs and EMDEs (66 units), we calculate the correlation coefficients between the treated unit’s inflation rate and that of each donor unit during the pre-treatment period. After sorting these correlations, we choose the subset of control units with the highest correlations—20 units for each treated AE and 50 units for each EMDE (see [Appendix C](#)).

One interesting improvement with this exercise is that of the pre-treatment imbalance among AEs. When we use idiosyncratic donor pools, small open economies characterized by a high inflation variability such as Israel, New Zealand, and the Slovak Republic show RMSPEs and MAPE-to-SD ratios below the cutoffs we impose, making their estimates worth reporting. In contrast, several EMDEs—Chile, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Philippines, and Romania—now show weaker fit pre-IT. In some cases, this could be due to the reduction in the quality of the donor set in spite of the gains in statistical association.


If we focus on the ATTs over the full post-intervention period, we can highlight a statistically significant gain in lower inflation in the Slovak Republic. In the group of AEs, we have a proportion close to 33% of effective ITCBs (4 out of 12). Robust cases in the group of EMDEs are Colombia, Hungary, Philippines, and South Africa.¹⁸ With regard to the DEV ratio, we observe that about 58% of the countries (15 out of 26) achieved a lower variability of inflation around the target during the full post-IT intervention period.¹⁹

Accordingly, we conclude that the main results we obtained with our baseline are largely robust to this alternative selection procedure for the donor pool.

¹⁸If we remove the EMDEs with poor pre-treatment imbalance in this exercise, we get a total of 8 treated units and only 3 with a statistically significant gain in disinflation (Colombia, Hungary, and South Africa)—that implies a ratio of 38% (3 out of 8 cases).

¹⁹Removing units with weak pre-treatment fit, this calculation yields a ratio of 60% (12 out of 20 cases).


Figure 3. Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations of Observed and Synthetic Inflation Rates from Inflation Target (DEV statistic), Advanced Economies



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the DEV ratios for four periods (from left to right): the first 12 quarters (12Q) of the post-treatment period, the first 20 quarters of the post-treatment period (20Q), the full post-treatment period, and the 2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4 period for those that implemented IT before 2007:Q1. This indicator compares the root mean squared deviations (RMSD) of the observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the IT band) with an analogous statistic calculated using the synthetic inflation rate instead. The ordering of economies is from the largest negative DEV ratio to the largest positive one in the full post-treatment period. A negative value denotes higher effectiveness in keeping the inflation rate close to the target (lower dispersion around the inflation target). Blue diamonds denote the rejection of a DEV ratio equal to zero at 10% significance level in a one-sided placebo test. Gray circles denote statistical insignificance. We label each treated unit with the corresponding 3-digit ISO code for the country in place of its name.

Figure 4. Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations of Observed and Synthetic Inflation Rates from Inflation Target (DEV statistic), EMDEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the DEV ratios for four periods (from left to right): the first 12 quarters (12Q) of the post-treatment period, the first 20 quarters of the post-treatment period (20Q), the full post-treatment period, and the 2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4 period for those that implemented IT before 2007:Q1. This indicator compares the root mean squared deviations (RMSD) of the observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the IT band) with an analogous statistic calculated using the synthetic inflation rate instead. The ordering of economies is from the largest negative DEV ratio to the largest positive one in the full post-treatment period. A negative value denotes higher effectiveness in keeping the inflation rate close to the target (lower dispersion around the inflation target). Blue diamonds denote the rejection of a DEV ratio equal to zero at 10% significance level in a one-sided placebo test. Gray circles denote statistical insignificance. We label each treated unit with the corresponding 3-digit ISO code for the country in place of its name.

Table 4. Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations of Observed and Synthetic Inflation Rates from Inflation Target (DEV statistic)

	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period
Advanced economies				
Australia	-1.25	-0.86	-0.90 *	-1.40
Canada	0.17	-0.28	-0.41	-1.39
Czech Republic	1.25	0.84	0.37	0.39
Iceland	1.58	1.09	1.46	3.84
Japan	-1.16 **	-1.60 **	-1.59 **	NA
Korea, Rep.	-1.02 *	-0.73 *	-0.66 **	-1.44 *
Norway	0.44	0.42	-0.32 *	0.09
Sweden	-0.04	0.20	-0.21 **	-0.23
United Kingdom	-3.98 **	-3.31 **	-1.41	-2.21 *
Emerging market and developing economies				
Albania	-4.02 **	NA	-3.65 **	NA
Chile	-4.54 *	-8.64 *	-4.22 **	-1.97 *
Colombia	-1.59 **	-3.28 **	-5.85 **	-7.68 **
Guatemala	0.38	-0.13	-0.35	-0.59
Hungary	-0.51	-0.57 *	-0.67 *	-1.72 **
India	-0.06	NA	-0.09	NA
Indonesia	1.05	0.74	-0.08	0.15
Peru	-1.41 *	-1.43 **	-1.70 **	-3.42 *
Philippines	-0.17	-0.47	-1.52 **	-2.91 **
Poland	-3.85 *	-3.16 *	-7.07 **	-11.52 **
Romania	-3.59 *	-3.79	-3.53 *	-4.22
Serbia	-2.08	-0.77	-5.16	-1.88
South Africa	1.53	2.29	0.54	-0.78 *
Thailand	-1.28 **	-0.93 *	-0.31	-0.75 *

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Inference: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, using the corresponding one-sided test. The DEV statistic is the ratio whose numerator is the difference between the root of the average squared deviations (RMSD) of the (demeaned) observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band) and the RMSD of the corresponding synthetic inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band). The denominator is the pre-treatment RMSPE, used as penalty for pre-treatment imbalance. A negative sign would indicate that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to its target than the estimated counterfactual inflation rate. NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no RMSD during the entire corresponding period).

5 Covariates of IT Effectiveness

5.1 Panel data evidence

In this section, we exploit the cross-sectional and the time dimension of the estimated DTE ($\widehat{\tau}_{jt} = \pi_{jt} - \widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N$ for each treated unit j and time t , as in equation (1)) and that of the difference between the absolute deviations of observed inflation from the target and the absolute deviations of the synthetic inflation from the target (that is, $|\pi_{jt} - \pi_{jt}^T| - |\widehat{\pi}_{jt}^N - \pi_{jt}^T|$ for each treated unit j and time t , as it relates to the numerator in equation (6)). We examine the statistical associations between various covariates and those measures of IT effectiveness. Specifically, we investigate whether IT performance is statistically linked to indicators of the economic and institutional constraints—broadly defined—that ITCBs encounter.

Our sample period coincides with a historical episode of broad-based capital account liberalization. Hence, we focus on proxies of monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability as proposed by [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#). The reasons are various. The ability and preferences of any ITCB will be constrained by its lack of monetary policy independence from the base country and by related considerations about the stability of its currency with respect to that of the base country.²⁰ Under largely open capital accounts, ITCBs with a degree of exchange rate flexibility (as those we investigate in this paper) that are also more monetary policy independent from the base country, other things equal, are expected to enjoy an improved ability to control inflation around the target. Similarly, more stable exchange rates are predicted when ITCBs can moderate the inflation level and its variability around the target more effectively. Moreover, a stable currency is sometimes seen as a requirement for central banks to preserve the stability of the financial system as well.

That said, we also consider a richer specification that controls for other potentially relevant covariates: an index of financial openness to quantify a country’s varying degree of capital account openness over time, accounting for the trilemma of international finance ([Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#); [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#)); an index of central bank independence from the domestic fiscal authorities ([Garriga \(2016\)](#)); an irregular central bank governor turnover dummy as an indicator of institutional instability ([Dreher et al. \(2010\)](#)); a financial development composite index measuring the depth, access, and efficiency of financial institutions and markets, as key determinants of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy ([Sahay et al. \(2015\)](#)); the budget balance as a percentage of GDP, where positive (negative) values

²⁰[Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#) defines the base country as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is most closely linked with as identified by [Shambaugh \(2004\)](#).

indicate the government’s surplus (deficit), as a fiscal proxy; an index of corruption controls measuring the institutional quality of the political system ([Political Risk Services \(PRS\) Group \(2020\)](#)); exports plus imports over GDP, as a measure of trade openness ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); the number of quarters under IT, as a proxy for the experience accumulated with IT; and the inflation target or the midpoint of the IT band. We also add country dummies and time dummies to account for unobserved characteristics of the data, and one lag of the dependent variable to capture the persistence of our IT performance measures.

Some of these covariates—namely, the central bank independence, corruption controls and financial openness indices—do not show much variability over time and only contribute, if anything, to the cross-sectional fit of the regressions. Serbia lacks monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness data. Additionally, the budget balance as a percentage of GDP is not reported for Albania and Iceland. Hence, data availability reduces the total number of AEs and EMDEs to 8 and 12 respectively in the corresponding specifications. For further description of the main covariates, see [Appendix B](#).

[Table 5](#) shows the main results of regressing the DTE on our two main covariates (monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability) and all other covariates listed above. We opt to include Japan with the negative of the DTE to capture the fact that an inflation above the counterfactual is a desired outcome for its central bank. The main conclusions do not depend on this modification. [Table 6](#) displays analogous estimates for the second dependent variable: the absolute deviations of observed inflation from target compared with its synthetic counterpart. In both tables, we show estimates for three samples: (i) all the economies, (ii) AEs only, and (iii) EMDEs only.

In spite of some sensitivity to the inclusion of additional regressors, the main finding illustrated in [Table 5](#) and [Table 6](#) is that both types of IT effectiveness are statistically associated with indicators of monetary independence and exchange rate stability in the full sample and, in particular, among EMDEs. Hence, an independent (autonomous) monetary policy and a stable currency provide favorable conditions for achieving greater success in controlling inflation with the adoption of an IT regime.

We interpret these results as statistical associations and not (necessarily) causal links. Most other controls do not have statistically significant association with our measures of IT effectiveness. However, for EMDEs, measures of the inflation target level and of experience (number of quarters under IT) are strongly significant for the DTE and the former also for the absolute deviations of inflation from target. Interestingly, the association between the inflation target and IT performance on inflation volatility is a novel finding that conforms with the predictions of the generalized New Keynesian model of [Ascari and Sbordone \(2014\)](#)

and [Ascari et al. \(2017\)](#) discussed in [Subsection 2.1](#).

The previous literature suggests that central bank independence is a requirement for an effective IT regime to achieve lower inflation ([Schaechter et al. \(2000\)](#); [Jonas and Mishkin \(2004\)](#); [Dotsey \(2006\)](#); [Leyva \(2008\)](#); [Freedman and Ötker Robe \(2009\)](#); [Svensson \(2010\)](#); [Jahan \(2012\)](#); [Frascaroli and Nobrega \(2019\)](#)). However, our analysis shows that central bank independence is statistically significant for maintaining stable inflation around a (credible) target, but only in AEs. In contrast, for EMDEs, institutional stability, as indicated by central bank governor turnover, and financial openness are more important factors.

We argue that central bank independence is crucial in AEs because it correlates with institutional reputation and credibility. In EMDEs, however, institutional credibility is typically weaker and central bank's reputation is often tied more to that of the central bank governor. Hence, turnover at the helm can be a better gauge of credibility among EMDEs. Additionally, EMDEs, especially small open economies, are highly vulnerable to external shocks when their financial openness is significant. All of this suggests that central bank independence is not universally necessary for improving the performance of an IT regime (i.e., there is no *precondition effect*). In cases of institutional instability (poor institutional quality) operating under financial openness, IT can still lead to significant reductions in inflation volatility around the target, even if central bank independence is to some extent compromised (i.e., there is some evidence of an *improvement effect*).

We also note that several studies contend that a well-developed (stable) financial system and sound financial markets are *necessary conditions* for a successful IT regime ([Schaechter et al. \(2000\)](#); [Jonas and Mishkin \(2004\)](#); [IMF \(2006\)](#); [Leyva \(2008\)](#); [Freedman and Ötker Robe \(2009\)](#); [Svensson \(2010\)](#); [Frascaroli and Nobrega \(2019\)](#)). Others argue that the absence of monetization of the fiscal deficit or absence of fiscal dominance are also *necessary conditions* of IT effectiveness ([IMF \(2006\)](#); [Leyva \(2008\)](#); [Roger \(2009\)](#); [Svensson \(2010\)](#); [de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza \(2012\)](#); [Jahan \(2012\)](#)). The intuition is twofold: first, an underdeveloped financial system or financial turbulence can create a trade-off between financial stabilization and IT. This trade-off can also arise with fiscal dominance. Second, a robust financial system enables effective monetary policy transmission, and avoiding deficit monetization eliminates a major inflationary driver ([IMF \(2006\)](#)).

In contrast, there is no clear association between IT performance and measures of financial and fiscal stability in the data. This should be interpreted with caution since the literature does not view those two factors as *sufficient conditions* for better IT performance. In fact, our sample includes the 2007 – 09 GFC, during which most countries with varying levels of financial deepening still exhibited good IT performance. If anything, that questions whether

financial stability is indeed a *necessary condition* for IT success. Moreover, Iceland’s poor IT performance highlights the detrimental effects of financial instability and exchange rate volatility for an ITCB. Thus, monetary independence and exchange rate flexibility alone may not be *sufficient conditions* for success with IT if the financial system is vulnerable.

5.2 Discussion

Since the 1970s, capital account liberalization and exchange rate flexibility have become more prevalent around the world, including in countries adopting IT. In fact, an ITCB is defined as a monetary policy regime largely free from monetary and exchange rate targets. According to the trilemma of international finance, greater capital mobility allows for more autonomous monetary policy, provided exchange rates are flexible (Aizenman (2019)). Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that many countries are nonetheless reluctant to allow much exchange rate variation, a phenomenon called "fear of floating" (FF). This reluctance arises from concerns about lack of credibility (manifested in large and frequent risk-premium shocks), high exchange rate pass-through to prices, and the adoption of IT as a policy anchor. The literature therefore highlights that some exchange rate stability can be a collateral result from adopting an IT regime.

Examining the relationship between an IT regime and exchange rate volatility through the lens of a Taylor (1993) rule shows that the systematic (and predictable) part of monetary policy, using short-term interest rates as the primary policy tool, reduces exchange rate volatility. If a central bank successfully stabilizes inflation around its target, it lowers the volatility of both the inflation differential and the nominal exchange rate relative to that of the base country under the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP)—particularly when the base country also aims for low, stable inflation.²¹ This holds true even if an exchange rate premium on the UIP condition exists, as long as IT adoption does not exacerbate the volatility arising from this premium.

²¹The UIP condition is given by $\mathbb{E}_t(\Delta e_{t+1}) = i_t - i_t^*$ where i_t (i_t^*) is the interest rate of the home (base) country, $\mathbb{E}_t(\cdot)$ is the expectations operator with information up to time t , and $\Delta e_{t+1} \equiv e_{t+1} - e_t$ is the first difference of the logged nominal exchange rate e_t . The Taylor (1993) rule describes domestic (foreign) policy as $i_t = r + \pi_t + \phi_\pi (\pi_t - \pi^T) + \phi_x x_t$ ($i_t^* = r^* + \pi_t^* + \phi_\pi (\pi_t^* - \pi^{*T}) + \phi_x x_t^*$), where x_t (x_t^*) is the output gap, π_t (π_t^*) is inflation, $\pi^T = \pi^{*T}$ is the common inflation target, and $r = r^*$ is the common steady state real interest rate. For simplicity, inflation is set as the sole policy objective for both countries ($\phi_x = 0$). Hence, replacing the policy rule into the UIP condition, it follows that $\mathbb{E}_t(\Delta e_{t+1}) = (1 + \phi_\pi)(\pi_t - \pi_t^*)$, so exchange rate volatility (Δe_{t+1}) appears related to fluctuations in the inflation differential ($\pi_t - \pi_t^*$).

Table 5. Covariates of IT Effectiveness: DTE (Dynamic Treatment Effect)

Covariates	ALL		AEs		EMDEs	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Monetary policy independence	-0.442 ** (0.188)	-0.504 ** (0.223)	-0.295 (0.312)	-0.420 (0.457)	-0.970 *** (0.207)	-1.075 *** (0.312)
Exchange rate stability	-1.305 ** (0.619)	-1.144 * (0.615)	-0.718 (0.670)	-0.057 (0.588)	-1.962 ** (0.891)	-2.230 * (1.047)
Financial openness		0.895 * (0.464)		-0.294 (0.276)		0.966 (0.763)
Central bank independence		0.203 (0.460)		0.373 (0.347)		1.408 (0.806)
Irregular CB governor turnover		0.310 * (0.153)		0.060 (0.100)		0.139 (0.201)
Corruption control		0.023 (0.180)		-0.215 * (0.093)		0.147 (0.331)
Financial development		0.758 (1.033)		1.311 (1.134)		2.292 (1.621)
Budget balance-to-GDP ratio		-0.012 (0.026)		-0.010 (0.016)		0.016 (0.036)
Trade openness		0.001 (0.005)		0.017 (0.009)		-0.002 (0.006)
Number of quarters under IT		-0.043 (0.025)		-0.008 * (0.004)		-0.055 *** (0.011)
Inflation target		-0.035 (0.042)		0.146 (0.106)		0.198 ** (0.081)
Lagged dependent variable	0.909 *** (0.021)	0.905 *** (0.013)	0.860 *** (0.012)	0.835 *** (0.014)	0.882 *** (0.017)	0.850 *** (0.013)
Country effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,548	1,458	736	665	812	793
No. of countries	22	20	9	8	13	12
R-squared	0.935	0.913	0.879	0.743	0.954	0.933

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; [Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#); [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#); [Dreher et al. \(2010\)](#); [Sahay et al. \(2015\)](#); [Garriga \(2016\)](#); [Political Risk Services \(PRS\) Group \(2020\)](#); authors' calculations.

Note: Inference: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dynamic treatment effect (DTE) is the difference between the actual and the synthetic series of inflation for each country and each quarter post-IT adoption. Japan's DTE is included with a negative sign to capture the fact that an inflation above the counterfactual is a desired outcome for the BOJ in the short term. For further details about the covariates, see [Appendix B](#).

Table 6. Covariates of IT Effectiveness: Absolute Deviations from Target

Covariates	ALL		AEs		EMDEs	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Monetary policy independence	-0.284 *	-0.309	-0.025	0.102	-0.864 ***	-0.709 **
	(0.160)	(0.198)	(0.116)	(0.188)	(0.216)	(0.260)
Exchange rate stability	-1.348 **	-1.177 ***	-0.930	-0.025	-1.173 **	-1.436 *
	(0.562)	(0.407)	(0.706)	(0.451)	(0.492)	(0.681)
Financial openness		1.142 *		0.057		1.689 **
		(0.572)		(0.272)		(0.555)
Central bank independence		0.364		1.142 ***		0.430
		(0.389)		(0.198)		(1.055)
Irregular CB governor turnover		0.334 **		-0.318		0.322 **
		(0.121)		(0.242)		(0.142)
Corruption control		0.097		-0.063		-0.043
		(0.171)		(0.131)		(0.303)
Financial development		-0.977		-1.808		0.237
		(1.155)		(1.708)		(1.423)
Budget balance-to-GDP ratio		0.008		0.016		0.072
		(0.029)		(0.010)		(0.050)
Trade openness		-0.003		-0.003		-0.005
		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.006)
Number of quarters under IT		-0.034		0.011		-0.021
		(0.029)		(0.007)		(0.012)
Inflation target		-0.006		0.163		0.413 ***
		(0.058)		(0.137)		(0.098)
Lagged dependent variable	0.900 ***	0.889 ***	0.833 ***	0.762 ***	0.853 ***	0.793 ***
	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.022)
Country effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,548	1,458	736	665	812	793
No. of countries	22	20	9	8	13	12
R-squared	0.917	0.891	0.791	0.719	0.944	0.925

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; [Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#); [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#); [Dreher et al. \(2010\)](#); [Sahay et al. \(2015\)](#); [Garriga \(2016\)](#); [Political Risk Services \(PRS\) Group \(2020\)](#); authors' calculations.

Note: Inference: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Absolute Deviations from Target is (i) the difference between actual inflation and its target point in absolute value minus (ii) the difference between the synthetic inflation and its target point in absolute value, for each country and each quarter post-IT adoption. For further details about the covariates, see [Appendix B](#).

Calvo and Reinhart (2002) also argue that a (credible) IT and FF are intimately connected and, therefore, harder to distinguish. But the evidence of Ball and Reyes (2008) suggests that (credible) IT “is empirically distinguishable from fixed, floating, managed floating and fear of floating (FF) regimes. Credible IT appears to be more similar to floating and managed floating than to fixing or FF.” Similar to Ball and Reyes (2008), our evidence indicates that an IT regime is not a “perfect substitute” for a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime but tends to be associated with more stable exchange rates.²² However, we recognize that greater exchange rate stability might also contribute to enhance IT effectiveness—so causality could run both ways. For that reason, the results in Table 5 and Table 6 cannot (necessarily) be interpreted in a causal way—although illustrative of the correlation between our measures of IT effectiveness and exchange rate stability.

Another related issue is that of foreign exchange interventions (Blanchard (2010); Dancourt (2015)). Among EMDEs, central banks that adopt IT under a flexible exchange rate regime may still choose to intervene in the exchange rate market and perhaps, in doing so, achieve greater exchange rate stability and greater IT effectiveness. Blanchard (2010), echoed by Dancourt (2015), puts it this way: “Isn’t it time to reconcile practice with theory, and to think of monetary policy more broadly, as the joint use of the interest rate and sterilized intervention, to protect inflation targets while reducing the costs associated with excessive exchange rate volatility?” Indeed, there are ITCBs among the EMDEs in our sample that have been successful using policy rates and some exchange rate interventions (Peru is an example). At the same time, other ITCBs have achieved some success while not intervening much, if at all, under fairly flexible exchange rate conditions (like many AEs). Chile is an intermediate case, and perhaps for that reason its performance under IT has been somewhat mixed—less successful in bringing down inflation compared to its counterfactual, although relatively more effective lowering its variability around the target rate.

In summary, an important avenue of future research would be to further investigate the causal significance of exchange rate interventions as a complementary instrument to facilitate exchange rate stability in a flexible exchange rate regime and to improve the efficacy of the IT regime to control inflation. A better understanding of this would go a long way to bring monetary theory closer to central banking practice under the constraints of the trilemma of international finance, as Blanchard (2010) and Dancourt (2015) remind us.

²²Although we have some reservations due to the quality of pre-treatment fit, we explored the effect of IT on the nominal exchange rate variability with SC techniques. The results are available upon request, but indicate that IT is not strongly associated with lower exchange rate volatility compared to the counterfactual. Rather, our overall findings suggest that exchange rate variability (together with autonomous monetary policy) is statistically correlated with IT effectiveness, particularly among EMDEs (see Subsection 5.1).

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper reassesses the benefits and potential pitfalls of inflation targeting (IT) in terms of changes in the inflation rate, its variability around the target, and its resilience during periods of global turmoil. Analyzing 23 economies, we construct counterfactuals using the demeaned synthetic control method (Ferman and Pinto (2021)). While IT has generally reduced inflation rates, the gains appear modest when we estimate the average treatment effects, particularly for advanced economies (AEs). Significant treatment effects are limited, with emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) showing more substantial and statistically significant gains. Approximately one out of three economies over the full post-intervention period shows a successful IT regime in terms of disinflationary gains.

We introduce a new measure of IT effectiveness based on the differences in root mean squared deviations from the target using actual and synthetic inflation rates. Most IT economies display improvements, especially among EMDEs, with significant reductions in inflation variability observed in nearly half of the cases. We also examine IT performance during the 2007 commodity price shock and the 2007 – 09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), finding notable disinflationary gains in one out of four economies and reduced inflation variability around the target in one out of two economies, particularly among EMDEs.

Our findings highlight the heterogeneous effects of IT, with AEs showing minimal statistical gains in inflation reduction and modest improvements in variability around the target (one in four countries), whereas EMDEs exhibit more pronounced benefits, reaching two out of five economies for the shift in the inflation level and two out of three economies for the volatility around the target, respectively.

Success of IT is statistically linked to monetary independence and exchange rate stability, particularly among EMDEs. Exchange rate stability can arise as a collateral benefit of IT. However, since capital account liberalization became the norm in-sample, stabilizing inflation with the policy rate alone poses challenges for IT adopters—as implied by the trilemma of international finance—and may require additional instruments like sterilized exchange rate interventions to tame exchange rate variability. Future research should explore the causal role of exchange rate interventions in achieving both inflation and exchange rate stability.

Finally, IT performance is also related to institutional quality (central bank independence among AEs and stability among EMDEs), the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (financial openness), and some key features of the regime itself (target level, experience with IT). We also recognize the importance of financial stability exploring the 2007 – 09 GFC episode and discuss the inflation concerns posed by *fiscal dominance* as well.

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Appendix

A Monetary policy and exchange rate regime classification

A.1 Inflation targeting classification

We document the IT adoption date and the requirements of our IT definition ([Condition 1](#) to [Condition 4](#)) from central bank and other official sources in [Table A1](#) and [Table A2](#). With some exceptions, there is a relatively low standard deviation of the IT adoption year in the sample across different studies (see [Table A3](#)). We typically choose an adoption date that is consistent with the most frequent adoption year reported in previous studies (see the column of modes in [Table A3](#)). [Table A4](#) highlights the reasons central banks adopt IT regimes based on their reports, statements, and additional sources.

We count 5 countries with a full IT regime that lack an adequate minimum number of post-treatment periods: Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Jamaica, and Ukraine. We classify 4 more countries as having a partial implementation of IT or quasi-IT: Spain, Switzerland, the U.S., and Uruguay.

Our IT definition leaves out the U.S. because [Condition 1](#) is not fulfilled. The Federal Reserve adopted a flexible IT regime in January 2012, but it operated under a dual mandate of achieving full employment and price stability, rather than focusing solely on inflation targeting.^{23,24} [Condition 1](#) and [Condition 3](#) (but possibly [Condition 4](#) too) exclude Uruguay because of its sporadic targeting of monetary aggregates, Switzerland because it did not claim to be an ITCB and followed an exchange rate regime classified as a pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement (see also [Truman \(2003\)](#)), and Spain because of its commitments under the European exchange rate mechanism. The latter has been usually viewed as an ITCB over the 1995 – 1999 period in previous research (see, e.g., [Bernanke and Mishkin \(1997\)](#); and [de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza \(2012\)](#)).^{25,26}

All of those 9 countries are removed from the current analysis over the full sample (or

²³For a discussion of the U.S. monetary policy frameworks from the Volcker’s era to the adoption of flexible average inflation targeting in August 2020, see [Duncan et al. \(2022\)](#).

²⁴The fact that a central bank’s statutory objective is price stability does not suffice to consider it an ITCB or a quasi-ITCB. Given that, the ECB is excluded from the treated group because it violates [Condition 1](#) in spite of its price stability mandate. The ECB also follows a two-pillar approach that gives weight in the conduct of monetary policy to the rate of growth of the M3 monetary aggregate ([Gros and Capolongo \(2019\)](#)), which conflicts with [Condition 3](#). Additionally, the supranational character of the ECB is also a distinct feature that sets it apart from any of the ITCBs and quasi-ITCBs considered in the paper.

²⁵For Spain, we did not find documents that support the idea that the central bank published inflation forecasts or used any accountability mechanism. [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#) classify Spain as having operated under a horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to $+/- 2$ percent (a *de facto* peg). However, the case of Spain is more complex on this point. After the crisis of the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992 – 1993, a grid (known as the Parity Grid) of bilateral rates was calculated on the basis of a central rate expressed in ECUs, and currency fluctuations of the Spanish peseta had to be contained within a margin of 6 percent on either side. Based on that fact, we argue Spain should be reclassified to a 3 in [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#)’s classification which recognizes more flexibility in exchange rates than that of a *de facto* peg.

²⁶Germany could be another quasi-IT case (see [Svensson \(2010\)](#) on this point).

some subset of the sample) not only from the treated group, but also from any control group. The 4 quasi-ITCBs are used for robustness checks, though. Hence, our initial set of treated units (ITCBs) based on [Condition 1](#) to [Condition 4](#) consists of 38 economies that adopted an explicit IT regime under some degree of exchange rate flexibility: 12 AEs and 26 EMDEs.

We use [Iizetzki et al. \(2019\)](#)'s coarse exchange rate regime classification with values between 2 and 5 as evidence of exchange rate flexibility. This requirement restricts the post-intervention period of countries such as Albania (2009:Q1 – 2013:Q4), Armenia (2006:Q1 – 2014:Q4), Czech Republic (1997:Q4 – 2013:Q4), Serbia (2006:Q3 – 2014:Q4), and the Slovak Republic (2005:Q3 – 2008:Q4). The latter one abandoned its IT regime to adopt the euro in 2009:Q1. The other economies adopted a *de facto* peg—Albania (2014:Q1), Armenia (2015:Q1), Czech Republic (2014:Q1), and Serbia (2015:Q1).

We drop all the units whose pre-treatment fit is not regarded as at least *good* or *very good*. Hence, our final set of treated units has two groups composed of 9 AEs and 14 EMDEs. [Table A5](#) provides evidence on pre-treatment fit for all the IT economies, so if the reader wishes to apply a more demanding requirement for the pre-treatment fit, it can be done easily, leading to other countries being excluded. For example, if $RMSPE < 2$ and $\frac{MAPE}{SD} < 0.5$, that would also exclude the Czech Republic from the AEs and Chile, (Hungary, just barely), Indonesia, and Philippines from the EMDEs.

Final groups of treated and control units. Treated group of AEs (9 countries): Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K.

Treated group of EMDEs (14 countries): Albania, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, and Thailand.

Donor pool for AEs (16 AEs and 4 EMDEs): Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, and Taiwan.

Donor pool for EMDEs (50 EMDEs): Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Vietnam, and Zambia.

Other full or quasi-ITCBs. Quasi-Inflation Targeters (3 AEs, 1 EMDE): Spain, Switzerland, the U.S., and Uruguay.

Other ITCBs (countries that use inflation targets but are not included in the main sample for different reasons; see [Table A1](#)): AEs (4): Finland, Israel, New Zealand, and the Slovak Republic. EMDEs (16): Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Jamaica, Mexico, Moldova, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, and Ukraine.

Table A1. IT Adoption Periods and Requirements of IT Regimes

Country	IT adoption period	Acknowledges IT explicitly?	Publishes forecasts?	Accountability mechanism?	Uses policy rate?	Flexible exchange rate regime during IT period?
Albania	2009Q1-2013Q4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Armenia	2006Q1-2014Q4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Australia	1993Q2-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Brazil	1999Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada	1991Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chile	1991Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colombia	1999Q3-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Czech Rep.	1997Q4-2013Q4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dominican Rep.	2012Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Georgia	2009Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ghana	2007Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	2003Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hungary	2001Q2-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iceland	2001Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
India	2015Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	2005Q3-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel	1991Q4-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Japan	2012Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kazakhstan	2015Q3-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Korea, Rep.	1998Q2-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mexico	1999Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Moldova	2011Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
New Zealand	1989Q4-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norway	2001Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	2011Q2-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	2002Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Philippines	2002Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poland	1998Q4-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Romania	2005Q3-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russian Federation	2015Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Serbia	2006Q3-2014Q4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Slovak Rep.	2005Q3-2008Q4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Africa	2000Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sweden	1993Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Thailand	2000Q2-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Turkey	2006Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uganda	2012Q3-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
United Kingdom	1992Q3-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Addendum: Other Possible IT Candidates and Quasi Inflation Targeters (Excluded from Main IT Sample)

Country	Possible target adoption period	Acknowledges IT explicitly?	Publishes forecasts?	Accountability mechanism?	Uses policy rate?	Flexible exchange rate regime during IT period?
<i>Inflation targeters with an insufficient number of post-IT periods</i>						
Argentina	2016Q3-2018Q3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	2018Q1-	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Finland	1993Q1-1994Q4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jamaica	2018Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ukraine	2017Q1-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Quasi-Inflation Targeters</i>						
Spain	1995Q1-1998Q4	No	No	No	Yes	No
Switzerland	2000Q1-2011Q2	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
United States	2012Q1-	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	2008Q3-2013Q4	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Source: [Debelle \(1997\)](#); [Mahadeva and Sterne \(2002\)](#); [Stone \(2003\)](#); [Levin et al. \(2004\)](#); [Roger and Stone \(2005\)](#); [Little and Romano \(2009\)](#); [Hammond \(2012\)](#); and central banks' documents and websites.

Note: The addendum to this table lists economies that are sometimes classified as inflation targeters or are candidates to be classified as inflation targeters because of the use of an inflation target. They were excluded from the main sample because at least one of the conditions described in [Section 2](#) are not satisfied or for having a too short post-intervention period (less than 12 quarters within the period under analysis). We restrict the IT period to one under exchange rate flexibility (coarse classifications 2 – 5 per [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#)) for Albania, Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, and Slovak Republic.

Table A2. Features of the Inflation Targeting Regimes

Country	IT adoption period	Target price index	Forecasts reported	Publishes forecasts?	Accountability mechanism	Policy rate	Exchange rate regime (Coarse classification 2019)
Albania	2009Q1–2013Q4	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	Quarterly Report	Key interest rate	2 (09Q1–13Q4), 1 (14Q1–18Q4)
Armenia	2006Q1–2014Q4	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Repo rate	2 (06Q1–14Q4), 1 (15Q1–18Q4)
Australia	1993Q2–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Cash rate	4
Brazil	1999Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH, OL	SELIC; overnight interest rate	2 (99Q1), 5 (99Q1–99Q3), 3 (99Q3–02Q4), 4(03Q1–08Q3), 3 (08Q4–18Q4)
Canada	1991Q1–	CPI	Inflation, others	Yes	PH	Overnight interest rate	2 (91Q1–02Q1), 4 (02Q2–18Q4)
Chile	1991Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Overnight interbank rate	3
Colombia	1999Q3–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Intervention interest rate	3
Czech Rep.	1997Q4–2013Q4	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Repo, Discount, & Lombard rate	2 (97Q4–99Q4), 3 (00Q1–13Q4), 1 (14Q1–18Q4)
Dominican Rep.	2012Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	OL	Monetary policy rate	2
Georgia	2009Q1–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	OL	Monetary policy rate	2
Ghana	2007Q1–	CPI	Inflation, others	Yes	PH	Prime rate	2 (07Q1–10Q4), 3 (11Q1–18Q4)
Guatemala	2003Q1–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	PH	Overnight interbank rate	2
Hungary	2001Q2–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Two-week central bank bond rate	3 (01Q2–09Q1), 2 (09Q2–18Q4)
Iceland	2001Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH, OL	Short-term loan and deposit rates	3
India	2015Q1–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	Monetary Policy Report	Policy (repo) rate	3
Indonesia	2005Q3–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Base rate	3 (05Q3–07Q2), 2 (07Q3–18Q1)
Israel	1991Q4–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Overnight rate	3
Japan	2012Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH, OL	Short-term policy interest rate	4
Kazakhstan	2015Q3–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	OL	Base rate	2 (15Q3–15Q4), 5 (15Q4–16Q4), 2 (17Q1–18Q4)
Korea, Rep.	1998Q2–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Base rate	5 (98Q2), 3 (98Q3–18Q4)
Mexico	1999Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Overnight interbank rate	3 (99Q1–15Q4), 5 (16Q1–18Q4)
Moldova	2011Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	OL	Monetary policy rate	2 (11Q1–14Q4), 5 (15Q1–15Q4), 3 (16Q1–18Q4)
New Zealand	1989Q4–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH, OL	Official cash rate	3
Norway	2001Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Key policy rate	3
Paraguay	2011Q2–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	Annual Report	Monetary policy rate	3
Peru	2002Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Reference interest rate	2 (02Q1–02Q4), 3 (03Q1–12Q2), 2 (12Q3–18Q4)
Philippines	2002Q1–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	OL	Key policy rates	2
Poland	1998Q4–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Reference rate	3
Romania	2005Q3–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	Annual Report	Monetary policy rate	3 (05Q3–06Q2), 2 (06Q3–18Q4)
Russian Federation	2015Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	OL	Key Rate	5 (15Q1–16Q1), 3 (16Q2–18Q4)
Serbia	2006Q3–2014Q4	CPI	Inflation	Yes	PH, OL	Repo rate	2 (06Q3–14Q4), 1 (15Q1–18Q4)
Slovak Rep.	2005Q3–2008Q4	HICP	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Key interest rate	2 (05Q3–08Q4), 1 (09Q1–18Q4)
South Africa	2000Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH	Repo rate	4
Sweden	1993Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Repo rate	3 (93Q1–98Q4), 2 (99Q1–08Q3), 3 (08Q4–18Q4)
Thailand	2000Q2–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH, OL	Repurchase rate	3
Turkey	2006Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH, OL	Repo rate	4 (06Q1–08Q3), 3 (08Q4–18Q2)
Uganda	2012Q3–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	PH	Central Bank rate	3 (12Q3–16Q1), 2 (16Q2–18Q4)
United Kingdom	1992Q3–	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	PH, OL	Repo rate	3 (92Q3–08Q4), 4 (09Q1–18Q4)

Addendum: Other Possible IT Candidates and Quasi Inflation Targeters (Excluded from Main IT Sample)							
Country	Possible target adoption period	Target price index	Forecasts reported	Publishes forecasts?	Accountability mechanism	Policy rate/Monetary aggregate	Exchange rate regime (Coarse classification 2019)
<i>Inflation targeters with an insufficient number of post-IT periods</i>							
Argentina	2016Q3–2018Q3	CPI	Inflation, GDP	Yes	Annual Report	Monetary policy rate	5 (16Q3–18Q3)
Costa Rica	2018Q1–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	None	Monetary Policy Rate	1
Finland	1993Q1–1994Q4	HICP	Inflation	Yes	NA	Tender rate	5 (93Q1), 2 (93Q2–94Q4), 1 (95Q1–18Q4)
Jamaica	2018Q1–	CPI	Inflation	Yes	OL	Monetary policy rate	2
Ukraine	2017Q1–	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH	Key policy rate	NA (17Q1–18Q4)
<i>Quasi-Inflation Targeters</i>							
Spain	1995Q1–1998Q4	CPI	None	No	None	Intervention rate	1
Switzerland	2000Q1–2011Q2	CPI	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	SNB Annual Report	Policy rate	3(00Q1–11Q2), 1 (11Q3–14Q4), 3(15Q1–18Q4)
United States	2012Q1–	PCE	Inflation, GDP, others	Yes	PH, OL	Federal Funds Rate	4
Uruguay	2008Q3–2013Q4	CPI	None	No	None	Policy rate & mon. aggregates	3

Source: [Debelle \(1997\)](#); [Mahadeva and Sterne \(2002\)](#); [Stone \(2003\)](#); [Levin et al. \(2004\)](#); [Roger and Stone \(2005\)](#); [Little and Romano \(2009\)](#); [Hammond \(2012\)](#); and central banks' documents and websites.

Note: PH denotes parliamentary hearings, OL means open letter. CPI is headline/broad/standard consumer price index, CPIX is the consumer price index excluding mortgage costs, PCE is personal consumption expenditures index, HICP is harmonized (headline) index of consumer prices. We denote missing information with NAs. Thailand targeted core CPI until 2014. South Africa used the annual average of the CPIX (2000 – 2003), then used CPIX from 2004 on. The U.K. used the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX; 1992 – 2003), then used CPI from 2004 on. The exchange rate regime code is registered over the IT adoption period following the coarse classification of [Iizetzki et al. \(2019\)](#) (see code identifiers in [Appendix A](#)). The addendum to this table lists economies that are quasi-inflation targeters or inflation targeters with a short post-IT period.

Table A3. IT Adoption Periods According to Previous Studies

Country	Average	Mode	Median	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Number of studies or classifications
Albania	2009	2009	2009	0	2009	2009	4
Argentina*	2017	...	2017	...	2017	2017	1
Armenia	2007	2006	2006	2	2006	2009	4
Australia	1993	1993	1993	0	1993	1994	40
Brazil	1999	1999	1999	0	1999	1999	39
Canada	1992	1991	1991	1	1991	1995	45
Chile	1995	1991	1991	4	1990	2001	45
Colombia	1999	1999	1999	1	1995	2000	39
Costa Rica*	2018	...	2018	...	2018	2018	1
Czech Rep.	1998	1998	1998	0	1997	1999	39
Dominican Rep.	2012	2012	2012	0	2012	2012	2
Finland*	1993	1993	1993	1	1993	1995	22
Georgia	2009	2009	2009	1	2009	2010	3
Ghana	2006	2007	2007	2	2003	2007	13
Guatemala	2005	2005	2005	1	2003	2006	15
Hungary	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2002	38
Iceland	2001	2001	2001	1	2001	2003	30
India	2015	2015	2015	0	2015	2015	2
Indonesia	2005	2005	2005	1	2005	2007	19
Israel	1995	1992	1992	3	1991	2004	44
Jamaica*	2018	...	2018	...	2018	2018	1
Japan	2011	2013	2013	3	2006	2013	4
Kazakhstan	2016	...	2016	1	2015	2016	2
Korea, Rep.	1999	1998	1998	1	1998	2001	38
Mexico	2000	2001	1999	2	1995	2003	45
Moldova	2011	2010	2011	1	2010	2013	4
New Zealand	1990	1990	1990	1	1988	1993	44
Norway	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	31
Paraguay	2012	2011	2011	1	2011	2013	3
Peru	2000	2002	2002	3	1994	2003	41
Philippines	2002	2002	2002	2	1995	2003	34
Poland	1998	1998	1998	2	1990	2004	42
Romania	2005	2005	2005	0	2005	2006	19
Russian Federation	2015	2015	2015	0	2015	2015	2
Serbia	2007	2006	2007	1	2006	2009	8
Slovak Rep.	2005	2005	2005	2	1998	2007	17
South Africa	2000	2000	2000	0	2000	2002	35
Spain*	1995	1995	1995	0	1994	1995	25
Sweden	1994	1993	1993	1	1993	1995	41
Switzerland*	2000	2000	2000	3	1993	2009	23
Thailand	2000	2000	2000	0	2000	2000	34
Turkey	2005	2006	2006	1	2002	2006	16
Uganda	2013	...	2013	2	2011	2014	2
Ukraine*	2017	...	2017	...	2017	2017	1
United Kingdom	1992	1992	1992	0	1992	1993	38
United States*	0
Uruguay*	2008	2008	2008	...	2008	2008	1

Source: The studies included are [Bernanke and Mishkin \(1997\)](#), [Debelle \(1997\)](#), [Schaechter et al. \(2000\)](#), [Corbo et al. \(2002\)](#), [Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel \(2002\)](#), [Fracasso et al. \(2003\)](#), [Fraga et al. \(2003\)](#), [Powell et al. \(2003\)](#), [Truman \(2003\)](#) (2 classifications), [Ball and Sheridan \(2004\)](#) (2 classifications), [Jonas and Mishkin \(2004\)](#), [Levin et al. \(2004\)](#), [Berg \(2005\)](#), [Pétursson \(2005\)](#), [Roger and Stone \(2005\)](#), [Vega and Winkelried \(2005\)](#) (2 classifications), [Allen et al. \(2006\)](#), [Dotsey \(2006\)](#), [Central Bank of Iceland \(2007\)](#), [Gosselin \(2007\)](#), [Lin and Ye \(2007\)](#) (2 classifications), [Rose \(2007\)](#) (2 classifications), [Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel \(2007\)](#) (2 classifications), [Gonçalves and Salles \(2008\)](#), [Leyva \(2008\)](#) (4 classifications), [Little and Romano \(2009\)](#), [Roger \(2009\)](#), [Ball \(2010\)](#), [Svensson \(2010\)](#), [Froemmel et al. \(2011\)](#), [Lee \(2011\)](#) (2 classifications), [Mollick et al. \(2011\)](#) (2 classifications), [Bleich et al. \(2012\)](#), [de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza \(2012\)](#) (2 classifications), [Hammond \(2012\)](#), [Jahan \(2012\)](#), [Pierdzioch and Rülke \(2013\)](#), [Bernanke et al. \(2018\)](#), [Combes et al. \(2018\)](#), [Fracaroli and Nobrega \(2019\)](#), [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#), [Fratzschler et al. \(2020\)](#), [Kim and Yim \(2020\)](#), IMF Annual Reports, central banks' documents, and other official sources.

Note: An asterisk denotes a country whose central bank is not formally classified as ITCB in the main sample or, even though it satisfies some of the conditions that characterize an inflation targeter in our study, was excluded due to an insufficient number of post-intervention periods.

Table A4. Possible Reasons for IT adoption

Country	Main possible reason(s) for the adoption of an IT regime	IT adoption to achieve disinflation?	IT adoption to lock in inflation or price stability?	IT adoption to achieve higher inflation?	Other reason?
Albania	Ensure and maintain price stability. Anchoring economic agents' expectations and reducing inflation risk premium.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Armenia	Maintain price stability. Faced difficulty in handling broad money measures under monetary targeting regime.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Australia	Lock in the low inflation that had occurred in the aftermath of the early 1990s recession.	No	Yes	No	No
Brazil	Forced off a fixed exchange rate regime, search for a new anchor within IMF program.	No	No	No	Yes
Canada	Provide a new monetary anchor and bring down inflation.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Chile	Reduce inflation in a context of a healthy financial system and robust external accounts. Provide a new monetary anchor.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Colombia	Dissatisfaction with earlier framework, search for a new anchor within IMF program. Gradualism in pace of disinflation.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Czech Rep.	Forced off a fixed exchange rate regime, bring down inflation with future EU membership in mind.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Dominican Rep.	To strengthen monetary policy effectiveness in place of a monetary targeting regime.	No	No	No	Yes
Georgia	Ensure price stability as necessary pre-requisite for growth.	No	Yes	No	No
Ghana	Reduce inflation to the lower-single digit range.	Yes	No	No	No
Guatemala	Promote a gradual reduction in inflation and price stability.	Yes	Yes	No	No
Hungary	Increasing incompatibility of fixed exchange rate regime and disinflation; bring down inflation with future EU membership in mind.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Iceland	Dissatisfaction and problems with fixed exchange rate regime and capital deregulation.	No	No	No	Yes
India	Reduce inflation and ensure low and stable inflation expectations.	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Indonesia	Control growth in base money in line with real economy needs. Bring inflation down to a low, stable level.	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Israel	Lock in disinflation and define the slope of the exchange rate crawling peg.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Japan	Ensure price stability on a sustainable basis.	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kazakhstan	Ensure price stability, allowing free-floating exchange rate.	No	Yes	No	No
Korea, Rep.	Ensure stable inflation after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.	No	Yes	No	No
Mexico	Problems with earlier fixed exchange rate and monetary target; provide a new nominal anchor.	No	No	No	Yes
Moldova	Ensure price stability.	No	Yes	No	No
New Zealand	Part of extensive reforms, dissatisfaction with earlier outcomes; provide a new nominal anchor.	No	No	No	Yes
Norway	Final phase in gradual movement towards flexible exchange rate and stronger emphasis on low inflation and price stability.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Paraguay	To reduce inflation level, but also align inflation expectations with the medium-term inflation target.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Peru	Ensure stable prices over the projected period and within the announced range, greater transparency of policy.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Philippines	Promote low and stable rate of inflation conducive to balanced and sustainable economic growth.	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Poland	Considered the most effective way to bring down inflation as a precondition for subsequent EU membership.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Romania	Anchor inflation expectations to the inflation target.	No	No	No	Yes
Russian Federation	Strike a balance between inflation reduction, economic growth, and financial stability.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Serbia	Increase transparency of its monetary policy and efficient communication with the public, achieve lower core inflation.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Slovak Rep.	Motivated to meet Maastricht inflation criteria for EU membership and euro currency adoption.	No	No	No	Yes
South Africa	Curb inflation expectations and provide consistency and transparency in the conduct of monetary policy.	No	No	No	Yes
Sweden	Forced off a fixed exchange rate regime; search for a new anchor to secure price stability.	No	No	No	Yes
Thailand	Inflation targeting considered more appropriate with floating exchange rate than money supply targeting; ensure price and financial stability and economic growth.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Turkey	Ensure price stability for sustainable economic growth.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Uganda	Enhance the effectiveness and transparency of monetary policy, control of inflation over medium term.	No	Yes	No	Yes
United Kingdom	Need to find a viable monetary policy framework after exiting the ERM in 1992 to rebuild credibility.	No	No	No	Yes
#Yes		14	18	1	30
#No		24	20	37	8
Addendum: Other Possible IT Candidates and Quasi Inflation Targeters (Excluded from Main IT Sample)					
Country	Main possible reason(s) for the adoption of an IT regime	IT adoption to achieve disinflation?	IT adoption to lock in inflation or price stability?	IT adoption to achieve higher inflation?	Other reason?
<i>Inflation targeters with an insufficient number of post-IT periods</i>					
Argentina	Bring down inflation, create more transparency in the relationship between monetary policy decisions and inflation targets.	Yes	No	No	Yes
Costa Rica	Effort to improve transparency and independence of central bank.	No	No	No	Yes
Finland	Stabilize the underlying indicators of consumer prices.	No	Yes	No	No
Jamaica	Enhance transparency of monetary policy and greater accountability of Central Bank.	No	No	No	Yes
Ukraine	Bringing inflation back down to its target and ensuring price stability. More effective, transparent and accountable monetary authority.	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Quasi-Inflation Targeters</i>					
Spain	Gearred toward securing price stability by influencing economic agents' price expectations, preparing for euro adoption.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Switzerland	Dissatisfaction with earlier regime; however, the central bank did not consider itself on a formal inflation target.	No	No	No	Yes
United States	Anchor long-term inflation expectations and thereby fostering price stability.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Uruguay	Price stability to preserve currency value.	No	Yes	No	No
#Yes		2	5	0	7
#No		7	4	9	2

Source: Annual reports and bulletins from Central Banks, [Debelle \(1997\)](#), [Chowdhury and Siregar \(1998\)](#), [Cihák and Holub \(1998\)](#), [Gómez-Pineda et al. \(2002\)](#), [Morandé \(2002\)](#), [Bean \(2004\)](#), [Pétursson \(2005\)](#), [Csermely et al. \(2007\)](#), [Hammond \(2012\)](#), [Shirakawa \(2012\)](#), [Alonso \(2018\)](#), [Anand et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Mohan and Ray \(2019\)](#).

Note: #Yes and #No indicate the number of affirmative and negative answers to each question. Other reasons include: anchoring economic agents' expectations, dissatisfaction with previous monetary arrangement, more transparency, accountability, or independence of monetary policy, preparing for another monetary arrangement, etc.

Table A5. Measures of Pre-Treatment Fit

	RMSPE	MAPE	SD	MAPE/SD
Advanced economies				
Australia	1.31	1.09	2.84	0.38
Canada	0.48	0.40	2.76	0.14
Czech Republic	2.15	1.65	3.93	0.42
Iceland	1.67	1.25	4.05	0.31
Israel	1.21	1.03	1.75	0.59
Japan	0.81	0.62	1.50	0.41
Korea, Rep.	1.38	1.06	2.24	0.47
New Zealand	3.11	2.82	4.78	0.59
Norway	1.16	0.89	3.22	0.28
Slovak Republic	2.34	1.58	2.75	0.58
Sweden	1.59	1.28	2.66	0.48
United Kingdom	0.77	0.62	2.35	0.27
Emerging market and developing economies				
Albania	0.77	0.61	1.76	0.35
Armenia	3.80	2.97	7.53	0.39
Brazil	19.37	10.44	39.65	0.26
Chile	2.99	2.38	5.83	0.41
Colombia	1.63	1.27	3.73	0.34
Dominican Republic	4.08	2.70	5.64	0.48
Georgia	4.02	3.01	7.79	0.39
Ghana	3.75	3.04	7.39	0.41
Guatemala	1.68	1.09	3.87	0.28
Hungary	2.02	1.60	7.50	0.21
India	1.80	1.38	3.03	0.46
Indonesia	2.62	1.65	5.22	0.32
Kazakhstan	3.14	2.36	6.86	0.34
Mexico	5.45	4.46	8.39	0.53
Moldova	4.72	4.05	9.09	0.45
Paraguay	3.73	2.78	7.82	0.36
Peru	0.62	0.44	6.27	0.07
Philippines	2.31	1.75	5.67	0.31
Poland	1.04	0.73	9.04	0.08
Romania	1.94	1.63	9.84	0.17
Russian Federation	7.75	4.98	14.09	0.35
Serbia	0.77	0.51	2.57	0.20
South Africa	1.02	0.77	3.49	0.22
Thailand	1.26	0.97	2.76	0.35
Turkey	9.96	8.77	19.53	0.45
Uganda	3.65	2.90	5.23	0.55

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: RMSPE denotes root mean squared prediction error, MAPE denotes the mean absolute prediction error, SD is the standard deviation. All the statistics are computed over the pre-treatment period of each treated unit. The pre-treatment period is the one before the adoption of IT. For the IT adoption periods, see [Table A1](#) or [Table A2](#). We consider that a treated unit shows "weak pre-treatment fit" if either its RMSPE is higher than 3 or the MAPE-to-SD ratio is higher than 0.5 over the pre-treatment period. We discard the following treated units due to weak pre-treatment fit: (3 AEs) Israel, New Zealand, and Slovak Rep.; (12 EMDEs) Armenia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Turkey, and Uganda.

A.2 Exchange rate regime classification

In order to apply [Condition 3](#), we follow the exchange rate regime coarse classification developed by [Ilzetzki et al. \(2019\)](#). The coarse classification codes range from 1 to 6 and are registered over the IT adoption period as follows: (1) no separate legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to $\pm 2\%$, *de facto* peg; (2) pre-announced crawling peg, pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to $\pm 2\%$, *de facto* crawling peg, *de facto* crawling band that is narrower than or equal to $\pm 2\%$; (3) pre-announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to $\pm 2\%$, *de facto* crawling band that is narrower than or equal to $\pm 5\%$, moving band that is narrower than or equal to $\pm 2\%$ (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time), managed floating; (4) freely floating; (5) freely falling; (6) dual market in which parallel market data is missing. See: <https://www.ilzetzki.com/irr-data>.

B Main covariates

Monetary policy independence. The index of monetary policy independence (MPI) is defined as the reciprocal of the annual correlation between the monthly interest rates of the home country and the base country. By construction, the maximum value is 1, and the minimum value is 0. Higher values of the MPI index mean more monetary policy independence. The base country is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is most closely linked with as in [Shambaugh \(2004\)](#). Source: [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#). See also database and further information at https://web.pdx.edu/%7Eito/trilemma_indexes.htm.

Exchange rate stability. The exchange rate stability (ERS) index is measured as a decreasing function of the annual standard deviation of the monthly change in the logged nominal exchange rate (NER) between the home country and the base country ($\sigma_{\Delta E}$). See [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#). The formula is given by $\frac{0.01}{0.01 + \sigma_{\Delta E}}$ and normalizes the index between 0 and 1. To avoid potential downward biases, [Aizenman et al. \(2010\)](#) apply a cut-off to the exchange rate variation. If the rate of monthly change in NER remains within the $\pm 0.33\%$ limits, the exchange rate regime is considered as “fixed” and the value of 1 is assigned for the ERS index. Additionally, single year pegs are removed assuming that they are possibly not intentional ones. Higher values of the ERS index denote more stable movement of the NER against the currency of the base country. See also database and further information at https://web.pdx.edu/%7Eito/trilemma_indexes.htm.

Financial openness. The financial openness (KAOPEN) index proposed by [Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#) (updated on 9/7/2019) measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. KAOPEN is constructed based on information from the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically, KAOPEN is the first standardized principal component of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions and on capital account transactions, and the requirement to surrender export proceeds. The KAOPEN index is normalized between zero and one. Higher values of the index suggest that an economy is more open to cross-border capital transactions ([Chinn and Ito \(2006\)](#); [Aizenman](#)

et al. (2010)). See also web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm.

Central bank independence. The central bank independence (CBI) index proposed by Garriga (2016) is the weighted average of four components: “CEO’s characteristics (appointment, dismissal and term of office of the chief executive officer of the bank); policy formulation attributions (who formulates and has the final decision in monetary policy, and the role of the central bank in the budget process); central bank’s objectives; and central bank’s limitations on lending to the public sector.” (Garriga (2016), p. 8). The CBI index has data available up to 2012 only. We update the CBI index to the final year of our sample for all the countries in our dataset by collecting all the statutory changes recorded in the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) at: <https://data.imf.org/cblld> (accessed through <https://cblld.imf.org/index.cshtml#/>, via <https://www-extranet.imf.org/App42>, on May 17, 2020), supplemented with national sources whenever the CBLD was insufficient. Those statutory changes were then reflected into changes of the country’s CBI using the components, variables, coding criteria, and weights reported in Table 2.1 of Garriga (2016)’s online appendix at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iz9rr8Cj751XrGYM-mmq732pEwjCFVUM/view>. Otherwise, if no changes have been recorded, we keep the CBI at the previous year’s value. Whenever possible, we check for consistency with the data reported by the IMF’s Monetary Policy Frameworks - Independence and Accountability, Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications (IAPOC) toolkit at <https://data.imf.org/mpf>.

Irregular central bank governor turnover. Binary variable that equals 1 if the central bank governor is replaced before the end of the legal term in office, and 0 otherwise (Dreher et al. (2010)).

Corruption control index. Corruption control is a monthly proxy of the institutional quality related to the control of corruption in the political system. It is part of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database, which is published by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group (Political Risk Services (PRS) Group (2020)). According to the PRS Group, “(t)he most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.” We calculate the average of the corresponding three months of each quarter. It ranges from 1 to 6 points. Higher values of this proxy indicate more control of corruption.

Financial development. This is a composite index of financial development (FD) proposed by Sahay et al. (2015). Usually, financial development has been approximated by the ratio of private credit to GDP in the empirical literature. In contrast, this index includes financial institutions such as “banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Financial markets include stock and bond markets.” Thus, the authors define FD as “a combination of depth (size and liquidity of markets), access (ability of individuals and companies to access financial services) and efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets).” See p. 5 in Sahay et al. (2015) for more details and find the data at: <https://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B>.

Budget balance. The estimated central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP for a given year, both expressed in the national currency, as part of the ICRG

database collected by the PRS Group ([Political Risk Services \(PRS\) Group \(2020\)](#)). Positive (negative) values indicate government’s surplus (deficit).

Trade openness. It is defined as the sum of nominal exports plus nominal imports as a share of nominal GDP, all of them expressed in U.S. dollars, and multiplied by 100. The monthly import and export data is averaged to construct the corresponding quarterly series before computing these trade openness ratios. The data source is [Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#) complemented with national sources in some cases and from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database at: <https://data.imf.org/dot>.

Number of quarters under IT and inflation target. We include a variable that counts the accumulated number of quarters under a formal IT regime for every post-intervention period. This proxies for the stock of experience and learning under this monetary regime. A higher value of this variable is likely to be associated with more effectiveness in the application of IT. Furthermore, we also have another variable that tracks the inflation target or the midpoint of the IT band for every post-intervention period to account for cross-sectional and time variation in the policy objective of a formal IT regime.

Note: Whenever there is only annual data available, this is transformed to quarterly frequency assuming the same value of the corresponding annual indicator for year t applies in every quarter of year t .

C Additional data and findings

[Figure C1](#) and [Figure C2](#) show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit, the treatment period, the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted), and the target/tolerance bands (if adopted) for AEs and EMDEs, respectively. [Table C1](#) and [Table C2](#) report the estimated weights obtained for each synthetic unit among the AEs and EMDEs, respectively. Overall, we observe a reasonable level of sparsity across synthetic units in both treated groups.²⁷

[Table C3](#) and [Table C4](#) show the rank of each treated unit in the distribution of ratios (r_j) between the post-intervention and pre-intervention RMSPEs—key elements of the placebo study—jointly with the corresponding p-values (p_j) for each post-treatment sub-period for AEs and EMDEs, respectively. For example, in the first row, the column labeled “First 12Q Post-T (ATT > 0)” shows that Australia is ranked 14 out of 19 units that produce an SC estimate in the placebo run.²⁸ This corresponds to a p-value of 0.737. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average outcome gap (i.e., the ATT) is zero during the first 12 quarters of the post-treatment period.²⁹

²⁷Only a small number of units in the donor pool—1 to 4 among AEs and 2 to 5 among EMDEs—contribute with a weight higher than 10% to the counterfactual estimates in [Table C1](#) and [Table C2](#).

²⁸For the p-values, the SC algorithm cannot converge to a solution and provide an estimate for some control units. That is the reason why some p-values must be computed over a smaller number of units than the maximum number of control units plus the treated one (i.e., 21 for AEs and 51 for EMDEs).

²⁹The null hypothesis is that the outcome gap is zero for every period after the intervention ($H_0 : \tau_t = 0$ for $t \geq T_0$). This implies that the difference between the outcome variable of the treated unit and that of its counterfactual is zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the outcome gap is positive (negative) at least in one period after the intervention.

We report the ATTs and DEV statistics from relaxing our definition of IT to include the quasi-IT countries—Spain, Switzerland, the U.S., and Uruguay—in [Table C5](#). This evidence shows that the quasi-ITCBs’ ability to control inflation—shifting the level and/or stabilizing realized inflation around the target—is limited, a finding that is supported by [Figure C3](#). [Figure C3](#) shows the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit, the treatment period, the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted), and the target/tolerance bands (if adopted) for the quasi-IT countries.


We evaluate the robustness of our results using a full set of pre-treatment values of the outcome variable in [Table C6](#). That table reports the corresponding indicators of pre-treatment imbalance (RMSPE and MAPE-to-SD) and the ATTs and DEV statistics. In another robustness check, we also modify the donor pool proposed for the group of AEs and focus on industrialized economies only—removing the small number of EMDEs in the original donor pool. [Table C7](#) reports the indicators of pre-treatment fit, ATTs, and DEV statistics for the restricted donor pool with 16 AEs in that case.

Using the complete set of AEs and EMDEs consisting of 66 units, we conduct an alternative robustness check that starts by computing the correlation coefficients between the inflation rate of each treated unit and that of each donor unit during the pre-treatment period. We then sort those correlations and select the subset of control units exhibiting the highest correlations. Specifically, for each treated AE, we select a subset of 20 units, while for each treated EMDE, we choose 50 units. The new indicators of pre-treatment fit, ATTs and DEV statistics are shown in [Table C8](#). In an unreported robustness check, we chose 20 units (instead of 50 units) for each EMDE instead and got similar results at the cost of a somewhat weaker pre-intervention fit. Those estimates are available upon request.

Finally, [Figure C4](#) compares the two measures of IT effectiveness—the ATT and the measure of dispersion around the target (DEV ratio)—for both groups of economies (AEs and EMDEs) over the full post-treatment period. We change the sign of Japan’s ATT to make it comparable. The plots show a positive correlation between the two indicators of IT effectiveness in each group. This view is confirmed with the estimated coefficients: $\hat{\rho}_{AE} = 0.843$ (p-value= 0.004) and $\hat{\rho}_{EMDE} = 0.699$ (p-value= 0.005). The correlation for the full sample of countries is $\hat{\rho}_{All} = 0.764$ (p-value= 0.000).³⁰ That is, economies that, on average, achieve an inflation lower than their estimated counterfactual, tend to be those that keep the inflation closer to their target (compared with the estimated counterfactual). It is worth adding that there is no country that lies in the upper-right quadrant of both positive ATT and DEV except for Iceland.

³⁰Estimates are robust excluding Japan: $\hat{\rho}_{AE} = 0.828$ (p-value= 0.011), $\hat{\rho}_{All} = 0.764$ (p-value= 0.000).


Figure C1. Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - AEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C1. (cont.) Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - AEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C1. (cont.) Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - AEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C2. Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - EMDEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C2. (cont.) Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - EMDEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C2. (cont.) Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - EMDEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C2. (cont.) Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - EMDEs



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.


Figure C3. Actual and Synthetic (Demeaned) Inflation Rates - Quasi-ITers



Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The figures show the actual and synthetic (demeaned) inflation rates for each treated unit (black solid and black dashed lines, respectively). The figures also include the treatment period (red vertical line), the point inflation target (or midpoint of target/tolerance band if a point value is not adopted; blue solid line), and tolerance or target bands (whenever adopted; light blue shaded). The target and band limit values are also demeaned to facilitate the comparison.

Figure C4. Correlation of Measures of IT Effectiveness



Source: Dallas Fed’s Database of Global Economic Indicators (Grossman et al. (2014)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors’ calculations.

Note: The figures show the ATT and DEV statistics measured in the corresponding axes. The latter is a ratio whose numerator is the difference between (A) the root mean squared deviations of the (demeaned) observed inflation rate from the (demeaned) inflation target value (or the midpoint of the IT band) and (B) the root mean squared deviations of the corresponding synthetic inflation rate from the (demeaned) inflation target value (or the midpoint of the IT band). The denominator is the pre-treatment RMSPE as a penalty for pre-treatment imbalance. A negative sign indicates that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to its target than the estimated counterfactual inflation rate. Both statistics are calculated over the full post-treatment period of each economy. We opt to include Japan with the negative of the ATT to capture the fact that an inflation above the counterfactual is a desired outcome for its central bank. The estimated correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_{AE} = 0.843$ (p-value = 0.004), $\hat{\rho}_{EMDE} = 0.699$ (p-value = 0.005), and $\hat{\rho}_{All} = 0.764$ (p-value = 0.000). We label each treated unit with the corresponding 3-digit ISO code for the country in place of its name.

Table C1. Control Unit Weights for each Synthetic Unit - AEs

Control units	Australia	Canada	Czech Rep.	Iceland	Japan	Korea	Norway	Sweden	UK
Algeria	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.048
Austria	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.221	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bangladesh	0.985	0.063	0.000	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.034	0.075	0.058
Belgium	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.282	0.102
Cyprus	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.106
Denmark	0.000	0.138	0.000	0.763	0.000	0.000	0.798	0.000	0.000
France	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Germany	0.000	0.240	0.032	0.000	0.230	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Greece	0.000	0.060	0.864	0.000	0.038	0.000	0.143	0.216	0.072
Iran	0.000	0.051	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.025	0.000	0.000
Ireland	0.000	0.205	0.000	0.192	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Italy	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Luxembourg	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Malaysia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.154	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Malta	0.000	0.213	0.000	0.000	0.037	0.271	0.000	0.000	0.230
Netherlands	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.164	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.043
Portugal	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.097	0.000
Singapore	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.566	0.000	0.198	0.336
Slovenia	0.015	0.006	0.104	0.045	0.007	0.008	0.000	0.009	0.004
Taiwan	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.152	0.000	0.123	0.000
Descriptive statistics									
Min	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max	0.985	0.240	0.864	0.763	0.230	0.566	0.798	0.282	0.336
#<0.010	18	12	17	17	12	17	16	14	12
#>0.01 & <0.1	1	4	1	1	4	0	2	2	4
#>0.1	1	4	2	2	4	3	2	4	4

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Control units are displayed in rows, treated units are placed in columns. #< 0.01 counts the number of weights lower than 0.01; #> 0.01 & < 0.1 indicates the number of weights between 0.01 and 0.1, and #> 0.1 reports the number of weights larger than 0.1.

Table C2. Control Unit Weights for each Synthetic Unit - EMDEs

Control units	Albania	Chile	Colombia	Guatemala	Hungary
Algeria	0.110	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bahrain	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bangladesh	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bhutan	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bolivia	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bulgaria	0.211	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.014
Burundi	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012
Cabo Verde	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Cameroon	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Central African Republic	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Chad	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.021	0.000
China	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Congo, Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Ecuador	0.000	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.027
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
El Salvador	0.000	0.000	0.087	0.303	0.000
Equatorial Guinea	0.000	0.194	0.000	0.000	0.000
Ethiopia	0.000	0.000	0.119	0.000	0.104
Fiji	0.000	0.000	0.130	0.000	0.000
Gabon	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Gambia, The	0.026	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Guinea-Bissau	0.008	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.028
Haiti	0.075	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Honduras	0.000	0.164	0.000	0.000	0.366
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Jordan	0.000	0.000	0.075	0.000	0.000
Kenya	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.059	0.000
Kuwait	0.000	0.000	0.122	0.519	0.000
Madagascar	0.093	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.000
Malawi	0.053	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.086
Malaysia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Myanmar	0.108	0.000	0.087	0.054	0.027
Nepal	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Nigeria	0.137	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pakistan	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panama	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Papua New Guinea	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Rwanda	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.067
Samoa	0.000	0.000	0.159	0.000	0.000
Saudi Arabia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Seychelles	0.000	0.218	0.000	0.000	0.000
Solomon Islands	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Sri Lanka	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.152
Sudan	0.000	0.000	0.042	0.000	0.026
Suriname	0.000	0.234	0.000	0.000	0.000
Tanzania	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Tunisia	0.101	0.000	0.085	0.000	0.000
Vanuatu	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vietnam	0.000	0.022	0.012	0.028	0.000
Zambia	0.000	0.090	0.017	0.000	0.092
Descriptive statistics					
Min	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max	0.211	0.234	0.159	0.519	0.366
#<0.010	40	42	37	43	38
#>0.01 & <0.1	5	4	9	5	9
#>0.1	5	4	4	2	3

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Control units are displayed in rows, treated units are placed in columns. #< 0.01 counts the number of weights lower than 0.01; #> 0.01 & < 0.1 indicates the number of weights between 0.01 and 0.1, and #> 0.1 reports the number of weights larger than 0.1.

Table C2. (continued) Control Unit Weights for each Synthetic Unit - EMDEs

Control units	India	Indonesia	Peru	Philippines	Poland
Algeria	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bahrain	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bangladesh	0.048	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bhutan	0.024	0.198	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bolivia	0.000	0.000	0.096	0.011	0.000
Bulgaria	0.007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Burundi	0.000	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.000
Cabo Verde	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Cameroon	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Central African Republic	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Chad	0.000	0.000	0.017	0.039	0.000
China	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Congo, Rep.	0.019	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.028
Ecuador	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.107
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
El Salvador	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Equatorial Guinea	0.018	0.000	0.000	0.121	0.000
Ethiopia	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.243	0.260
Fiji	0.175	0.000	0.000	0.220	0.000
Gabon	0.000	0.000	0.083	0.000	0.000
Gambia, The	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Guinea-Bissau	0.000	0.197	0.010	0.026	0.056
Haiti	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Honduras	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.022	0.000	0.109	0.000	0.000
Jordan	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.072	0.000
Kenya	0.000	0.000	0.309	0.000	0.068
Kuwait	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Madagascar	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Malawi	0.023	0.299	0.001	0.000	0.000
Malaysia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Myanmar	0.006	0.122	0.090	0.000	0.000
Nepal	0.380	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Nigeria	0.000	0.185	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pakistan	0.148	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panama	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Papua New Guinea	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Rwanda	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Samoa	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
Saudi Arabia	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Seychelles	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Solomon Islands	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Sri Lanka	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.267	0.000
Sudan	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.094
Suriname	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.035
Tanzania	0.000	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.026
Tunisia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vanuatu	0.051	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vietnam	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.258
Zambia	0.000	0.000	0.137	0.000	0.068
Descriptive statistics					
Min	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max	0.380	0.299	0.309	0.267	0.260
#<0.010	39	45	38	42	40
#>0.01 & <0.1	8	0	9	4	7
#>0.1	3	5	3	4	3

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Control units are displayed in rows, treated units are placed in columns. #< 0.01 counts the number of weights lower than 0.01; #> 0.01 & < 0.1 indicates the number of weights between 0.01 and 0.1, and #> 0.1 reports the number of weights larger than 0.1.

Table C2. (continued) Control Unit Weights for each Synthetic Unit - EMDEs

Control units	Romania	Serbia	South Africa	Thailand
Algeria	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bahrain	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.102
Bangladesh	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bhutan	0.354	0.000	0.000	0.000
Bolivia	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.001
Bulgaria	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000
Burundi	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.059
Cabo Verde	0.000	0.000	0.088	0.000
Cameroon	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Central African Republic	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Chad	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.000
China	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Congo, Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Ecuador	0.541	0.000	0.000	0.000
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000
El Salvador	0.000	0.000	0.074	0.000
Equatorial Guinea	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Ethiopia	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.000
Fiji	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Gabon	0.000	0.000	0.026	0.000
Gambia, The	0.000	0.000	0.103	0.000
Guinea-Bissau	0.000	0.000	0.045	0.000
Haiti	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Honduras	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.056
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Jordan	0.000	0.000	0.069	0.080
Kenya	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Kuwait	0.000	0.099	0.000	0.000
Madagascar	0.000	0.038	0.000	0.002
Malawi	0.000	0.539	0.000	0.000
Malaysia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.174
Myanmar	0.104	0.000	0.041	0.105
Nepal	0.000	0.000	0.219	0.037
Nigeria	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pakistan	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panama	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Papua New Guinea	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.086
Rwanda	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.044
Samoa	0.000	0.000	0.073	0.177
Saudi Arabia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Seychelles	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Solomon Islands	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Sri Lanka	0.000	0.245	0.000	0.000
Sudan	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Suriname	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Tanzania	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Tunisia	0.000	0.000	0.122	0.000
Vanuatu	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.063
Vietnam	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.011
Zambia	0.000	0.062	0.006	0.000
Descriptive statistics				
Min	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max	0.541	0.539	0.219	0.177
#<0.010	47	44	38	38
#>0.01 & <0.1	0	4	9	8
#>0.1	3	2	3	4

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: Control units are displayed in rows, treated units are placed in columns. #< 0.01 counts the number of weights lower than 0.01; #> 0.01 & < 0.1 indicates the number of weights between 0.01 and 0.1, and #> 0.1 reports the number of weights larger than 0.1.

Table C3. Rank and P-Values - Various Post-Treatment (Sub-)Periods, AEs

	First 12Q Post-T (H1:ATT>0)	First 12Q Post-T (H1: ATT<0)	First 20Q Post-T (H1: ATT>0)	First 20Q Post-T (H1: ATT<0)	Full Post-T (H1: ATT>0)	Full Post-T (H1: ATT<0)	2007Q1- 2009Q4 (H1: ATT>0)	2007Q1- 2009Q4 (H1: ATT<0)
Australia								
Rank	14	8	16	8	14	11	16	9
P-value	0.737	0.444	0.842	0.421	0.667	0.524	1.000	0.600
Canada								
Rank	3	1	3	1	11	2	9	4
P-value	0.188	0.059	0.167	0.056	0.524	0.095	0.529	0.308
Czech Rep								
Rank	9	14	11	15	18	20	19	20
P-value	0.474	0.700	0.579	0.750	0.857	0.952	1.000	0.952
Iceland								
Rank	3	14	6	18	5	14	1	NA
P-value	0.167	0.778	0.316	0.900	0.238	0.667	0.053	NA
Japan								
Rank	1	14	1	16	2	11	NA	NA
P-value	0.059	0.667	0.059	0.762	0.095	0.524	NA	NA
Korea								
Rank	3	6	5	7	12	5	15	4
P-value	0.188	0.333	0.294	0.389	0.571	0.238	0.882	0.211
Norway								
Rank	7	6	12	11	8	11	14	12
P-value	0.412	0.300	0.667	0.524	0.381	0.524	0.824	0.667
Sweden								
Rank	16	14	17	14	21	19	15	15
P-value	0.889	0.778	0.944	0.700	1.000	0.905	0.882	1.000
UK								
Rank	NA	1	NA	1	20	4	17	4
P-value	NA	0.056	NA	0.056	0.952	0.190	1.000	0.308

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The rank denotes the position of the treated unit in the placebo run sorted from the highest post-T RMSPE/pre-T RMSPE ratio to the lowest. The p-value is the number of ratios higher or equal than that of the treated unit as a percentage of all the units in the placebo run. The null hypothesis is that the ATT is zero (the alternative, H1, is that the ATT is strictly positive/negative). Full Post-T (ATT > 0) denotes the full post-treatment period (one-sided test) for outcome gaps larger than or equal to zero. Full Post-T (ATT < 0) denotes the full post-treatment period (one-sided test) for outcome gaps lower than zero. First 12Q Post-T and First 20Q Post-T cover the first 12 or 20 quarters of the post-treatment period (one-sided test). 2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4 covers statistics for such period whenever it is available for that treated unit (one-sided test). NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps, with that specific sign, during the corresponding period).

Table C4. Rank and P-Values - Various Post-Treatment (Sub-)Periods, EMDEs

	First 12Q Post-T (H1:ATT>0)	First 12Q Post-T (H1: ATT<0)	First 20Q Post-T (H1: ATT>0)	First 20Q Post-T (H1: ATT<0)	Full Post-T (H1: ATT>0)	Full Post-T (H1: ATT<0)	2007Q1- 2009Q4 (H1: ATT>0)	2007Q1- 2009Q4 (H1: ATT<0)
Albania								
Rank	5	NA	NA	NA	7	29	NA	NA
P-value	0.106	NA	NA	NA	0.137	0.569	NA	NA
Chile								
Rank	35	7	39	6	46	9	NA	7
P-value	0.833	0.152	0.886	0.128	0.902	0.176	NA	0.194
Colombia								
Rank	NA	2	NA	2	44	1	NA	1
P-value	NA	0.049	NA	0.045	0.863	0.020	NA	0.026
Guatemala								
Rank	39	27	41	13	44	12	NA	10
P-value	0.886	0.659	0.891	0.289	0.863	0.235	NA	0.244
Hungary								
Rank	27	9	31	7	40	5	24	2
P-value	0.600	0.209	0.689	0.163	0.784	0.098	0.571	0.050
India								
Rank	27	10	NA	NA	21	38	NA	NA
P-value	0.659	0.217	NA	NA	0.412	0.745	NA	NA
Indonesia								
Rank	29	44	36	47	38	40	43	42
P-value	0.644	0.957	0.750	1.000	0.760	0.800	0.915	1.000
Peru								
Rank	30	1	26	1	29	7	37	8
P-value	0.698	0.024	0.578	0.024	0.580	0.140	0.881	0.242
Philippines								
Rank	37	8	42	8	44	3	NA	3
P-value	0.925	0.205	0.977	0.190	0.863	0.059	NA	0.088
Poland								
Rank	44	3	47	3	44	3	NA	1
P-value	0.957	0.083	1.000	0.073	0.880	0.060	NA	0.036
Romania								
Rank	NA	17	NA	18	44	14	NA	16
P-value	NA	0.378	NA	0.375	0.880	0.280	NA	0.364
Serbia								
Rank	NA	21	33	19	34	6	NA	24
P-value	NA	0.477	0.702	0.413	0.708	0.125	NA	0.558
South Africa								
Rank	3	30	6	2	19	2	16	7
P-value	0.070	0.714	0.133	0.043	0.373	0.039	0.390	0.175
Thailand								
Rank	20	4	27	4	18	6	16	2
P-value	0.476	0.093	0.600	0.083	0.353	0.118	0.381	0.049

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: The rank denotes the position of the treated unit in the placebo run sorted from the highest post-T RMSPE/pre-T RMSPE ratio to the lowest. The p-value is the number of ratios higher or equal than that of the treated unit as a percentage of all the units in the placebo run. The null hypothesis is that the ATT is zero (the alternative, H1, is that the ATT is strictly positive/negative). Full Post-T (ATT > 0) denotes the full post-treatment period (one-sided test) for outcome gaps larger than or equal to zero. Full Post-T (ATT < 0) denotes the full post-treatment period (one-sided test) for outcome gaps lower than zero. First 12Q Post-T and First 20Q Post-T cover the first 12 or 20 quarters of the post-treatment period (one-sided test). 2007:Q1 – 2009:Q4 covers statistics for such period whenever it is available for that treated unit (one-sided test). NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps, with that specific sign, during the corresponding period).

Table C5. Robustness Check: Quasi-IT Cases

	RMSPE MAPE/SD		Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Units				Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations from Inflation Target (DEV ratio)			
			First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period
Spain	0.69	0.17	0.43	0.32	0.32	NA	0.66	0.57	0.57	NA
Switzerland	0.80	0.31	0.50	0.52	0.52	0.45	-0.59	-0.62	-0.56	-0.34
United States	0.79	0.37	-0.28	-0.22	-0.01	NA	-0.17	0.13	0.12	NA
Uruguay	10.23	0.36	-3.89	-4.39	-4.41	NA	-0.41	-0.46	-0.46	NA

Source: Dallas Fed’s Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors’ calculations.

Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, using the corresponding one-sided test. NA denotes not applicable (i.e., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps during the corresponding period). The DEV statistic is the ratio whose numerator is the difference between (i) the root of the average squared deviations of the (demeaned) observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band) and (ii) the root of the average squared deviations of the corresponding synthetic inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band). The denominator is the pre-treatment RMSPE, used as penalty for pre-treatment imbalance. A negative sign would indicate that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to its target than the estimated counterfactual inflation rate. The statistics are calculated over various post-treatment sub-periods.

Table C6. Robustness Check: All Pre-treatment Outcome Values as Predictors

	RMSPE MAPE/SD		Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units				Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations from Inflation Target (DEV ratio)			
			First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period
			AEs							
Australia	1.31	0.38	-0.88	-0.69	-0.84	-1.94	-1.25	-0.86	-0.90 **	-1.40
Canada	0.47	0.14	-1.12 *	-1.85 *	-0.37 *	-0.57	0.56	0.00	-0.41	-1.53
Czech Rep.	2.15	0.42	1.24	0.36	-0.72	-0.16	1.20	0.86	0.38	0.42
Iceland	1.67	0.31	1.69	1.78	3.02	7.48 *	1.58	1.09	1.46	3.84
Japan	0.81	0.41	1.53 *	1.68 *	1.57 *	NA	-1.16 **	-1.61 **	-1.59 **	NA
Korea, Rep.	1.40	0.48	-0.54	-0.42	-1.56	-2.06	-1.08 *	-0.80 *	-0.74 **	-1.53 *
Norway	1.16	0.28	0.34	0.13	0.82	0.43	0.45	0.38	-0.38 *	0.05
Sweden	1.65	0.51	0.35	0.22	1.78	1.92	0.33	0.21	-0.94 **	-0.67 *
United Kingdom	0.77	0.27	-3.52 *	-2.75 *	-1.43	-1.42	-3.98 **	-3.31 **	-1.40	-2.23 *
EMDEs										
Albania	0.77	0.34	3.66	NA	3.10	NA	-3.80 **	NA	-3.41 **	NA
Chile	3.07	0.43	-8.88	-20.24	-10.28	-9.82	-4.55 *	-8.25 *	-4.28 **	-3.03 **
Colombia	1.64	0.34	-4.56 **	-6.36 **	-9.91 **	-12.17 **	-1.42 **	-3.17 **	-5.65 **	-7.24 **
Guatemala	1.68	0.28	0.32	-0.66	-1.94	-3.62	0.24	-0.32	-0.57	-1.00 *
Hungary	2.02	0.21	-0.91	-1.49	-2.29 *	-2.43 *	-0.50	-0.56 *	-0.66 *	-1.70 **
India	1.79	0.45	-1.11	NA	-1.02	NA	-0.02	NA	-0.10	NA
Indonesia	2.62	0.32	2.08	1.55	-0.86	0.35	1.05	0.74	-0.08	0.15
Peru	0.49	0.06	-1.20 *	-0.63 *	1.31	-0.19	-0.86	-0.95 **	-2.09 **	-2.64
Philippines	2.37	0.31	-3.03	-2.83	-4.96 **	-8.06 *	-0.44	-0.73	-1.75 **	-3.10 **
Poland	1.03	0.08	-5.09	-5.64	-8.28	-9.88 *	-4.03 *	-3.19 *	-6.69 **	-11.00 *
Romania	1.93	0.17	-6.93	-7.22	-8.33	-8.06	-3.42	-3.65	-3.38	-4.05
Serbia	0.66	0.20	-2.30	-1.72	-5.22	-2.06	-1.50	-0.36	-7.04	-1.23
South Africa	0.99	0.22	2.00 *	-0.35 **	-0.68 **	-0.30	1.68	2.29	0.50	-0.83 *
Thailand	1.26	0.35	-1.33 *	-0.79 *	0.53	-1.78 *	-1.20 **	-0.87 *	-0.25	-0.78 *

Source: Dallas Fed’s Database of Global Economic Indicators (Grossman et al. (2014)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors’ calculations.

Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, using the corresponding one-sided test. NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps during the corresponding period). The statistic DEV is a ratio whose numerator is the difference between the root of the average squared deviations of the (demeaned) observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band) and the root of the average squared deviations of the corresponding synthetic inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band). The denominator is the pre-treatment RMSPE, used as penalty for pre-treatment imbalance. A negative sign would indicate that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to its target than the estimated counterfactual inflation rate. The statistics are calculated over various post-treatment sub-periods.

Table C7. Robustness Check: Advanced Economies’ Donor Pool without EMEs

	Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units						Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations from Inflation Target (DEV ratio)			
	RMSPE	MAPE/SD	First 12Q	First 20Q	Full Post-T T Period	2007-2009 Period	First 12Q	First 20Q	Full Post-T T Period	2007- 2009 Period
			Post-T Period	Post-T Period			Post-T Period			
AEs										
Australia	1.93	0.55	-0.05	-0.97	-0.39	-0.41	0.38	0.49	0.16	0.00
Canada	0.59	0.17	-1.47 *	-1.96 *	-1.09	-1.41	0.22	0.17	-0.41	-0.85
Czech Republic	2.15	0.42	1.12	0.22	-0.52	-0.30	1.25	0.84	0.24	0.39
Iceland	1.67	0.31	1.69	1.78	3.02	7.48 *	1.58	1.09	1.46	3.84
Japan	0.87	0.45	1.73 *	1.89 *	1.72	NA	-1.43 *	-1.80 *	-1.71 *	NA
Korea, Rep.	1.56	0.54	-0.22	-0.01	-1.61	-2.38	-1.16 *	-0.85 *	-0.87 *	-1.67
Norway	1.18	0.27	0.13	-0.07	0.67	0.32	0.59	0.51	-0.27	0.16
Sweden	1.62	0.49	-0.43	-0.79	0.40	0.58	-0.13	0.14	-0.28	-0.25
United Kingdom	0.85	0.28	-3.40 *	-2.69 *	-1.77	-1.83	-3.47 *	-2.90 *	-1.45 *	-2.32 *

Source: Dallas Fed’s Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors’ calculations.

Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, using the corresponding one-sided test. NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps during the corresponding period). The statistic DEV is a ratio whose numerator is the difference between the root of the average squared deviations of the (demeaned) observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band) and the root of the average squared deviations of the corresponding synthetic inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band). The denominator is the pre-treatment RMSPE, used as penalty for pre-treatment imbalance. A negative sign would indicate that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to its target than the estimated counterfactual inflation rate. The statistics are calculated over various post-treatment sub-periods.

Table C8. Robustness Check: Donor Pools with the Most Correlated Inflation Rates

	Average Treatment Effects on the Treated Units						Differences in Root Mean Squared Deviations from Inflation Target (DEV ratio)			
	RMSPE	MAPE/SD	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period	First 12Q Post-T Period	First 20Q Post-T Period	Full Post-T Period	2007-2009 Period
AEs										
Australia	0.33	0.14	1.07	2.14	6.27	6.67	-2.55	-4.46 *	-9.84 **	-9.62 **
Canada	0.26	0.15	-1.81 *	-2.59 **	-2.49 **	-4.17 *	0.36	-1.26 **	-2.90 **	-5.67 **
Czech Rep.	1.16	0.20	1.57	-0.04	-1.40	-1.63	-2.65	-2.30	-1.23 *	-0.77
Iceland	2.34	0.29	1.57	1.64	2.71	6.88 *	1.62	1.27	1.35	3.18
Israel	0.74	0.40	-2.99	-2.59	-2.74	-4.16	-0.93	-1.04	-1.19	-4.40 *
Japan	0.62	0.41	1.60 *	1.53 *	1.41 **	NA	-1.32	-1.52 *	-1.47 *	NA
Korea, Rep.	1.36	0.39	-0.30	-0.12	-1.12	-2.23 *	-0.66 *	-0.49	-0.65 **	-2.10 **
New Zealand	2.40	0.26	-0.41	-5.59	-1.43	0.01	0.09	-5.09 **	-2.72	-1.16
Norway	0.84	0.22	0.07	Norway	0.34	-0.12	0.98	0.67	0.05	0.31
Slovak Rep.	1.53	0.34	-3.67 *	NA	-5.70 **	-9.19 *	-0.63	NA	-2.74 **	-3.82 *
Sweden	1.95	0.42	-2.05	-2.60	-2.83	-3.42	-1.27	-0.93	-0.78	-1.49
United Kingdom	0.63	0.27	-4.09 *	-3.85 *	-3.48 **	-4.13 *	-4.65 **	-4.45 **	-3.47 **	-5.22 **
EMDEs										
Albania	0.67	0.35	2.19	NA	2.08	NA	-2.00 *	NA	-2.14 *	NA
Chile	7.52	0.36	-7.05	-17.56	-7.67	-5.52	-4.35 *	-8.68 *	-4.22 *	-1.85
Colombia	2.60	0.33	-5.51 **	-6.60 **	-10.66 **	-12.08 **	-1.47 **	-2.98 **	-6.12 **	-7.09 **
Guatemala	2.85	0.28	0.47	-0.61	-1.66	-3.17	0.37	-0.38	-0.38	-0.65
Hungary	3.56	0.20	-0.90 *	-1.42 *	-2.43 **	-2.18 **	-0.61 *	-0.59 *	-0.73 *	-1.65 **
India	3.22	0.45	-1.12	NA	-1.20	NA	-0.04	NA	-0.17	NA
Indonesia	6.88	0.32	1.99	1.50	-0.86	0.35	0.94	0.73	-0.08	0.15
Peru	0.55	0.09	-2.66	-2.85 *	-2.52	-3.98	-1.91 **	-1.97 *	-3.40 **	-5.51 **
Philippines	5.26	0.31	-2.05	-2.18	-3.95 *	-7.11 *	-0.23	-0.53	-1.46 *	-2.82 **
Poland	0.95	0.08	-4.70 *	-6.74 *	-10.99 **	-12.85 **	-3.18 *	-4.15 *	-9.65 **	-14.06 **
Romania	4.32	0.18	-6.33	-6.38	-7.27	-7.13	-2.88	-2.98	-2.61	-3.35
Serbia	0.58	0.19	-2.52	-1.65	-4.87	-2.37	-2.02	-0.65	-5.59	-1.88
South Africa	0.97	0.23	2.23	-0.26 **	-0.55 *	0.44	3.21	3.08	0.96	0.36
Thailand	1.51	0.36	-2.05 *	-0.96 *	0.69	-1.52 **	-1.79 **	-1.21 **	-0.48 *	-0.74 *

Source: Dallas Fed's Database of Global Economic Indicators ([Grossman et al. \(2014\)](#)); national statistical offices and central banks; authors' calculations.

Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, using the corresponding one-sided test. NA denotes not applicable or not available (e.g., the unit did not adopt IT during that period; there are no outcome gaps during the entire corresponding period). The statistic DEV is a ratio whose numerator is the difference between the root of the average squared deviations of the (demeaned) observed inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band) and the root of the average squared deviations of the corresponding synthetic inflation rate from the inflation target value (or the midpoint of the target/tolerance band). The denominator is the pre-treatment RMSPE, used as penalty for pre-treatment imbalance. A negative sign would indicate that the inflation rate was, on average, closer to its target than the estimated counterfactual inflation rate. The statistics are calculated over various post-treatment sub-periods. The donor pool of each AE (EMDE) is composed of 20 (50) units with the highest correlation coefficients between the inflation rates of the treated and the control unit calculated during the pre-treatment period from a pool of 66 AEs and EMDEs.